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Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code 
Jeanne L. Schroeder* 
Much of the discussion of bitcoin in the popular press has 
concentrated on its status as a currency. Putting aside a vocal 
minority of radical libertarians and anarchists, however, many 
bitcoin enthusiasts are concentrating on how its underlying 
technology – the blockchain – can be put to use for wide variety 
of uses. For example, economists at the Fed and other central 
banks have suggested that they should encourage the evolution 
of bitcoin’s blockchain protocol which might allow financial 
transactions to clear much efficiently than under our current 
systems. As such, it also holds out the possibility of becoming 
that holy grail of commerce – a payment system that would 
eliminate or minimize the roles of third party intermediaries. In 
addition, the NASDAQ and a number of issuers are 
experimenting with using the blockchain to record the issuing 
and trading of investments securities. 
In this article I examine the implications for bitcoin under the 
Uniform Commercial Code (the “U.C.C.”). Specifically, I 
consider three issues. In Part 1, I discuss the characterization of 
bitcoin – which I am using generically to refer to any virtual or 
cryptocurrency – under Article 9. The bad news is that it does 
not, and cannot be made to fit into, the U.C.C.’s definition of 
“money”. If held directly by the owner, bitcoin constitutes a 
“general intangible”. Unfortunately, general intangibles are 
non-negotiable. This could greatly impinge on bitcoin’s liquidity 
and, therefore, its utility as a payment system. 
                                                                                                             
*  Professor of Law, The Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, 
New York City. I’d like to thank David Gray Carlson and Aaron Wright for their 
comments. 
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In Part 2, I show how this may be mitigated by the rules of 
Article 8 governing investment securities. If the owner of bitcoin 
were to choose to hold it indirectly through a financial 
intermediary, then she and the intermediary could elect to have 
it treated as a “financial asset” which is super-negotiable. 
Unfortunately, this comes at the cost of eliminating one of the 
primary attractions of cryptocurrency, namely the ability to 
engage in financial transactions directly without a third-party 
intermediary. However, Article 8, may already provide a legal 
regime for another contemplated use for the blockchain – 
namely as a readily searchable means of recording the 
ownership and transfer of property generally. 
In Part 3, I explain how cryptosecurities fall squarely within 
Article 8's definition of “uncertificated securities.” Ironically, 
therefore, the creation of bitcoin securities may finally breathe 
life to little used provisions that were invented almost 40 years 
ago in a failed attempt to solve a completely different problem. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Bitcoin has garnered tremendous attention in the 6 years since it was 
launched by its almost certainly pseudonymous creator Satoshi 
Nakamoto.2 In “his” manifesto, Nakamoto describes bitcoin as a virtual 
                                                                                                             
2  Joshua Davis chronicled his unsuccessful attempt to track down the programmer, or, 
more likely, team of programmers, who posted under the Nakamoto name. Joshua Davis. 
The Crypto-Currency, Bitcoin and its mysterious inventor, THE NEW YORKER 62, Oct. 10, 
2011. Although “Nakamoto” claims to be a Japanese man, his/their English makes some 
suspect that he is (or they are) British or Irish. Id. at 68. 
 In the March 2014, the magazine Newsweek attempted to make a triumphant return 
to print publication with a cover story claiming to have identified the real Satoshi 
Nakamoto—a Japanese American engineer who is actually named Satoshi Nakamoto. 
Leah McGrath Goodman, The Face Behind Bitcoin, NEWSWEEK, March 6, 2014, 
available at http://www.newsweek.com/2014/03/14/face-behind-bitcoin-247957.html. 
This Nakamoto denied that he was the notorious Nakamoto and the supposed revelation 
was met with skepticism. See, e.g., Matthew Herper, Linguistic Analysis Says Newsweek 
Names the Wrong Man As Bitcoin’s Creator, FORBES (March 20, 2014) http://www.
forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2014/03/10/data-analysis-says-newsweek-named-the-
wrong-man-as-bitcoins-creator; Joe Mullin, The colossal arrogance of Newsweek’s 
Bitcoin “scoop,” ARSTECHNICA (March 20, 2014) http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014
/03/the-colossal-arrogance-of-newsweeks-bitcoin-scoop/. 
 Other more plausible identifications of Nakamoto include Hungarian-born 
American, Nick Szabo (Nathaniel Popper, Decoding the Enigma of Satoshi Nakamoto 
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currency that would avoid the inflationary and other real or imagined 
risks of “fiat currencies.”3 Some proponents hope it might undermine the 
control of the Federal Reserve Bank (“the Fed”) and other central banks.4 
Much of the discussion in the popular press has concentrated on its status 
as a currency and such scandals as the collapse of Mt. Gox, at that time 
the biggest bitcoin exchange,5 the conviction of Ross Ulbricht for 
                                                                                                             
and the Birth of Bitcoin, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2015) http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/1
7/business/decoding-the-enigma-of-satoshi-nakamoto-and-the-birth-of-bitcoin.html?_r=
0) and, most recently, Australian Craig Steven Wright (Andy Greenberg & Gwern 
Branwen, Bitcon’s Creator Satoshi Nakomoto Is Probably This Unknown Australian 
Computer Genius, WIRED (Dec. 8, 2015) http://www.wired.com/2015/12/bitcoins-
creator-satoshi-nakamoto-is-probably-this-unknown-australian-genius/). Wright first 
claimed, then subsequently and mysteriously seemed to disclaim, this distinction. Paul 
Vigna, Bitcon’s Mr. Wright Now Says We Won’t Prove He Started Currency, WALL ST. J. 
(May 5, 2016) http://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoins-purported-father-withdraws-offer-of-
more-evidence-1462456086. Andrew O’Hagan, the novelist and editor at large for 
Esquire and the London Review of Books was hired to write a biography of Wright as 
Nakamoto by an investor group that sought to patent and monetize his inventions. He 
recounts this bizarre episode that ended when Wright was unable or unwilling to 
substantiate his claims in Andrew O’Hagan, The Satoshi Affair, 38 LONDON REV. OF 
BOOKS 7 (JUNE 30, 2016). 
3  In Nakamoto’s words “The root problem with conventional currency is [that] the 
central bank must be trusted not to debase the currency, but the history of fiat currencies 
is full of breaches of that trust.” Quoted by Davis, supra note 2, at 62. 
 Bitcoin supporters tend to argue that bitcoin is not a fiat currency because it is not 
adopted by a country with a central bank. Indeed, this is how the term is defined in New 
York’s so-called “bit-license” rule governing virtual currency businesses. 23 CRR-NY 
§ 200.2 (1986). 
 Nevertheless, bitcoin can be considered a fiat currency in that it also has no 
underlying asset. Its value consists of trust. The term alludes to God’s word of command 
in the Vulgate (e.g. “fiat lux,” or “let there be light”) through which He created the world 
ex nihilo. BIBLIA SACRA VULGATA, GENESIS 1:3. 
4  According to Alan Feuer in The New York Times: 
Elizabeth Ploshay, a regular writer for Bitcoin Magazine, . . . 
explained it, bitcoin isn’t merely money; it’s “a movement”—a 
crusade in the costume of a currency. Depending on whom you talk 
to, the goal is to unleash repressed economies, to take down global 
banking or to wage a war against the Federal Reserve. 
Alan Feuer, The Bitcoin Ideology, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/12/15/sunday-review/the-bitcoin-ideology.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbi
as%3As. Feuer continues: 
The hard-line bloc is exemplified by the crypto-anarchist developers 
of a bitcoin product called Dark Wallet, which is scheduled to be 
introduced next year and will include extra protections to ensure that 
bitcoin transactions remain secure, anonymous and difficult to trace. 
“We see this as part of the total sublation of the state,” said Cody 
Wilson, Dark Wallet’s director. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
5  When it closed in February of 2014, Mt. Gox announced that bitcoin then valued at 
around $500 million could not be found. Ben McLannahan, MtGox ‘lost coins’ long 
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founding and operating the Silk Road on-line illegal drug marketplace 
that accepted bitcoins as payment6 and the arrest of Charlie Shrem, one 
of the most well-known bitcoin promoters, for helping Ulbricht launder 
money.7 
Putting aside a vocal minority of radical libertarians and anarchists, 
however, many bitcoin enthusiasts are concentrating less on its use as an 
alternative currency, per se, but on how its underlying technology—the 
blockchain—can be put to use for wide variety of uses,8 ranging from 
smart contracts9 to securities trading.10 For example, although the U.S. 
Treasury and its state counterparts are concerned about the use of bitcoin 
for money laundering and for financing terrorism, to date, they are not 
seeking to prohibit it as a rival to the U.S. dollar, but merely regulating 
                                                                                                             
before collapse, FIN. TIMES (April 19, 2015), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0694b99c-e647-
11e4-ab4e-00144feab7de.html#axzz3e11ThTvw. 
6  Ulbricht received a life-sentence. Nicole Hong, Silk Road Founder Ross Ulbricht 
Sentenced to Life in Prison, WALL ST. J. (May 29, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sil
k-road-founder-ross-ulbricht-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-1432929957?KEYWORDS=Ulb
richt. 
7  Shrem was one of the founders of Bitinstant, a bitcoin exchange. He eventually pled 
guilty to charges relating to an unlicensed money service business and was sentenced to 2 
years in prison. Robin Sidel, Bitcoin Entrepreneur Charlie Shrem Reports to Prison, 
WALL ST. J. (March 30, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/03/30/bitcoin-
entrepreneur-charlie-shrem-reports-to-prison/?KEYWORDS=shrem. 
8  For a far ranging discussion of the wide variety of potential uses for the blockchain 
technology, see Aaron Wright & Primavera Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain 
Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia, SOC. SCI. RESEARCH NETWORK (Jan. 17, 
2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664. 
 For general introductions to legal interests concerning cybercurrency and 
blockchains see Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Bitproperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805 (2015); Larissa 
Lee, New Kids on the Blockchain: How Bitcoin’s Technology Could Reinvent the Stock 
Market, S.J. QUINNEY C. OF L., U. OF UTAH LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES PAPER NO. 
138, (2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2656501; Hillary J. Allen, $ = € = Bitcoin, 
SUFFOLK U. L. SCH. LEGAL STUD. RES. SERIES PAPER NO. 15-33 (Sept. 12, 2015), http://ssr
n.com/abstract=2645001; Juliet M. Moringiello, Electronic Issues in Secured Financing, 
WIDENER U. COMMONWEALTH L. SCH. LEGAL STUD. RESEARCH PAPER SERIES PAPER NO. 
15-20 (Jan. 17, 2015), SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2657551; 
Stephen T. Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes, Regulating Cryptocurrencies in the 
United States: Current Issues and Future Directions, 40-2 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 813 
(2014) (survey of regulation of Bitcoin and other virtual currencies through 2013); Joshua 
J. Doguet, The Nature of the Form: Legal and Regulatory Issues Surrounding the Bitcoin 
Digital Currency System, 73-4 LA. L. REV. 1119 (2013); and Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy 
Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency, and the Case Against its Regulation, 
TEMPLE U. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER (2012), SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract_id=2115203. 
9  See, e.g., A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application 
Platform, ETHEREUM WHITE PAPER, https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper. 
10  See infra text at notes 17-18, 160-68. 
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certain bitcoin exchanges as Money Service Businesses (“MSB’s”).11 
Indeed, economists at the Fed and the Bank of England have suggested 
that they should encourage the evolution of bitcoin’s blockchain protocol 
which might allow financial transactions to clear much efficiently than 
under our current systems.12 It also holds out the possibility of becoming 
that holy grail of commerce—a payments system that would eliminate or 
minimize the roles of third party intermediaries.13 
The World Bank reports that, although they have fallen in recent 
years, international remittance fees (i.e. the money transmittal fees 
charged by intermediaries to migrants, frequently sending money to their 
families back home) average well over 7%.14 If a bitcoin transaction 
could be achieved for 1%, we could increase the aggregate family 
income of these typically impoverished people by billions of dollars 
virtually overnight.15 Blockchain transactions could also potentially be a 
god-send to the 27% of U.S. households who are sometimes referred to 
as un-banked or under-banked—that is, those overwhelmingly lower-
                                                                                                             
11  DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FIN-2013-G001, 
GUIDANCE: APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, 
EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013); see also New FinCEN Guidance 
Changes Regulatory Landscape for Virtual Currencies and Some Prepaid Programs, 
PERKINS COIE (Mar. 22, 2013), https://www.perkinscoie.com/en/news-insights/new-
fincen-guidance-changes-regulatory-landscape-for-virtual.html. 
12  See, e.g., Robleh Ali, John Barrdear, Roger Clews & James Southable, Innovations 
in payment technologies and the emergence of digital currencies, 54-3 BANK OF ENG. Q. 
BULLETIN 262 (Sept. 14, 2014), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents
/quarterlybulletin/2014/qb14q3digitalcurrenciesbitcoin1.pdf [hereinafter Ali et al., 
Innovations]; Robleh Ali, John Barrdear, Roger Clews & James Southable and Robleh 
Ali, John Barrdear, Roger Clews & James Southable, The economics of digital currency, 
54-3 BANK OF ENG. Q. BULLETIN 276 (Sept. 14, 2014), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/p
ublications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2014/qb14q3.pdf [hereinafter Ali et al., 
Economics]. 
13  Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Member 
LLC, 108-4 N.W. U. L. REV. 1485 (2014). 
14  World Bank Group, Finance and Markets, 14 REMITTANCE PRICES WORLDWIDE 1 
(June 2015), available at https://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/sites/default/fi
les/rpw_report_june_2015.pdf. 
15  In 1999 the World Bank adopted an objective called 5x5, which aimed at lowering 
average remittance costs from 10% to 5% in five years. It estimated that this would 
decrease costs to migrants of up to $16 billion per year. Id. at 7 n. ii. 
 Unfortunately, although transaction costs for bitcoin transfers are extremely low 
today, a Bank of England report warns that, at least with respect to Nakamoto’s original 
bitcoin, certain aspects of its miner-verification system would inevitably result in 
significantly higher fees in the future if the volume of transactions were to increase 
significantly. Ali et al., Economics, supra note 12, at 282-83. 
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income and dis-proportionately minority Americans who are not 
adequately serviced by the financial intermediary industry.16 
Overstock, Inc. announced that it was issuing the first 
“cryptosecurity”—a Regulation D offering of bonds that will be recorded 
on a blockchain rather than a more traditional security transfer ledger.17 
Overstock’s founder and Chief Executive Officer, Richard Byrne, known 
as a strong libertarian, has suggested that this may help free finance from 
the tyranny of the SEC and the brokerage industry or, at least, prevent 
naked short-selling that he believes is used maliciously to drive down the 
price of issuer’s stock.18 
Blythe Masters, the former J.P. Morgan Chase banker who is often 
credited with the invention of the credit default swap has recently 
become the CEO of a firm that “intends to build a software platform for 
sophisticated financial institutions to settle trades made on third-party 
sites in digital currencies and in digitized versions of more traditional 
financial assets.”19 In Master’s words, bitcoin should not be thought of as 
“a store of value or an alternative currency or an investment . . . [but] as 
a medium for exchange and a mechanism for recording information.”20 
                                                                                                             
16 The FDIC estimates that 7.7% of American household are unbanked, and an additional 
20.0% are underbanked. 2013 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked 
Households (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/. 
17  Overstock.com, Inc. Press Release: Overstock.com Launches Offering of World’s 
First Cryptosecurity, GLOBE NEWSWIRE (June 5, 2015), http://investors.overstock.co
m/phoenix.zhtml?c=131091&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=2056957. John Beckerman, 
Overstock Launches Corporate Bond Billed as World’s First Cryptosecurity, WALL ST. J. 
(June 5, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/overstock-launches-corporate-bond-billed-
as-worlds-first-cryptosecurity-1433549038. According to its Annual Report on Form 10-
K for the Year Ended Dec. 31, 2015, Overstock.com has been experimenting in this 
technology. On two occasions it issued debt securities to investors (including CEO 
Richard Byrne) and then immediately repaid them. Overstock.Com, Inc. Annual Report 
on Form 10-K for year ended Dec. 31, 2015, at *67 (Dec. 31, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1130713/000113071316000071/ostk-
20151231x10k.htm. Overstock.com has also filed a shelf-registration that anticipates the 
future registration and sale of digital securities. Overstock.com, Inc. Form S-3 (Nov. 10, 
2015), https://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1130713/000104746915008523/a2226515zs-3a.htm 
 It is also been reported that UBS Bank has launched an “Innovation Lab” that is also 
exploring the possibility of so-called “smart bonds” using a blockchain. See, e.g., Sid 
Kalla, UBS Bank’s Innovation Lab Working on ‘Smart Bonds” on Bitcoin, COINSETTER, 
(June 15, 2015), http://www.coinsetter.com/bitcoin-news/2015/06/15/ubs-banks-innovati
on-lab-working-on-smart-bonds-on-bitcoin-2367. 
18  Cade Metz, Overstock’s Radical Plan To Reinvent The Stock Market With Bitcoin 
(July 30, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/07/overstock-and-cryptocurrency/. 
19  Michael J. Casey, Ex-J.P. Morgan CDS Pioneer Blythe Masters to Head Bitcoin-
Related Startup, WALL ST. J. (March 11, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ex-j-p-
morgan-cds-pioneer-blythe-masters-to-head-bitcoin-trading-platform-1426048878. 
20  Id. 
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R3CEV, a consortium of over 50 financial institutions, including 
such giants as Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan Chase and Bank of America, 
is exploring various uses of distributed ledger technology.21 In the spring 
of 2016, a number of banks including Citibank and J.P. Morgan Chase, 
along with the Depositary Trust and Clearing Corporation ran a test 
replicating a month’s worth of trading in Credit Default Swaps over a 
block chain.22 
If these ideas sound less apocalyptic than overturning the entire 
international monetary system, they may, in fact, offer a real chance for 
significant change in financial and commercial transaction comparable to 
those wrought by the internet and email.23 
In this article I examine the implications for bitcoin under the 
Uniform Commercial Code (the “U.C.C.”).24 Commercial law is the 
plumbing of finance—although most of us do not want to think about it, 
somebody better do so because the consequences of malfunctions can be 
catastrophic. 
Specifically, I consider three issues. In Part 1, I discuss the 
characterization of bitcoin cryptocurrency under Article 9, which 
governs secured transactions. The bad news is that bitcoin does not, and 
cannot be made to fit into, the U.C.C.’s definition of “money.”25 If held 
directly by the owner, bitcoin constitutes a “general intangible.”26 
Unfortunately, general intangibles are non-negotiable. That is, unlike 
virtually every other category of personal property recognized by Article 
9, once a general intangible becomes encumbered by a security interest, 
it can never become unencumbered even by transfer to a bona fide 
purchaser for value. This could greatly impinge on bitcoin’s liquidity 
and, therefore, its utility as a payment system. 
                                                                                                             
21 R3 CEV, r3CEV.com (last visited June 26, 2016). 
22 Telis Demos, Bitcoin Blockchain Technology Proves Itself in Market Test, WALL ST. 
J. (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoins-blockchain-technology-proves-
itself-in-wall-street-test-1460021421. 
23 Albert Wenger, Bitcoin As Protocol, UNION SQUARE VENTURES (Oct. 13, 2013), 
www.usv.com/posts/bitcoin-as-protocol?; Ali et al, Innovations, supra note 12, at 272-73. 
Indeed, one of the more prominent bitcoin alternates, Ripple, sees its goal as developing a 
universal blockchain protocol for the transfer of value comparable for the universal http 
internet and smtp email protocols. Bryant Gehring, What is the Ripple Protocol, RIPPLE 
(Feb. 19 2015), https://ripple.com/knowledge_center/what-is-a-protocol-how-does-ripple-
fit-in-2/. 
24 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the U.C.C. are to the most recent 
revisions adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Law. 
These were adopted with respect to Article 1 in 2001, Articles 2 and 3 in 2013, Article 8 
in 1994 and Article 9 in 2010. 
25 See infra text at notes 53-84. 
26 See infra text at notes 85-86. 
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In Part 2, I show how this may be mitigated somewhat by the rules of 
Article 8 governing investment securities. If the owner of bitcoin were to 
choose to hold it indirectly through a financial intermediary, then she and 
the intermediary could elect to have it treated as a “financial asset,” 
which is super-negotiable. Unfortunately, this comes at the cost of 
eliminating one of the primary attractions of cryptocurrency, namely the 
ability to engage in financial transactions directly without a third-party 
intermediary. Consequently, for bitcoin to live up to its full potential as a 
payment system, Article 9 would need to be amended. Article 8 as it 
currently exists, however, may already provide a legal regime for another 
contemplated use for the blockchain protocol beyond the transfer of 
cryptocurrency—as a readily searchable means of recording the 
ownership and transfer of property generally. 
In Part 3, I explain how, pace Overstock’s Byrne, the creation of a 
cryptosecurity is not as novel as he thinks. Although, obviously, bitcoin 
securities were not contemplated when the most recent version of Article 
8 was promulgated, they fall squarely within its definition of 
“uncertificated securities.”27 Ironically, therefore, the creation of bitcoin 
securities may finally breathe life to these little used provisions that were 
invented almost 40 years ago in a failed attempt to solve a completely 
different problem. 
PART 1: BITCOIN UNDER ARTICLE 9 
I. Introduction. 
A. Categorization. 
As every historian of commercial law knows, one of the great 
innovations of Article 9 is that it replaced the pre-code approach to 
secured lending, which had a different “special device” for each category 
of collateral. In contrast, Article 9 created a single concept—the security 
interest—that applies to all forms of personal property. It thereby 
transformed secured lending from an esoteric practice to the relatively 
simple regime we have today.28 It is easy to presume from this that the 
correct characterization of property is, therefore, unimportant. This 
would be a grave mistake. 
                                                                                                             
27 See infra text at notes 175-79. 
28 Indeed, some complain that we have made secured lending too easy such that 
frequently there are no unsecured assets left to compensate unsecured creditors, such as 
tort victims, if a debtor becomes insolvent. See generally, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Jessie 
M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE 
L. J. 857 (1996). 
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Article 9 lists at least 12 different categories of property (depending 
on how one counts), some of which include sub-categories as well. One 
reason for this multiplicity of categories is that, for both practical and 
historical reasons, Article 9’s attachment and perfection formalities differ 
based on the category. Most importantly for our purposes, what I will 
call the “negotiation” rules—that govern the ability of a transferee of 
collateral from a debtor to take free and clear of adverse claims, 
including security interests, of a first in time party—differ by category. 
Some forms of collateral, such as “money,” are what I will call “super-
negotiable.” Unfortunately, although bitcoin proponents would like it to 
function as currency, it is does not and cannot be made to fit within the 
U.C.C.’s narrow definition of money. By process of elimination, it falls 
within the catchall category of “general intangibles,” which are almost 
perfectly non-negotiable.29 
One might also at first blush think that the question as to whether 
bitcoin is a super-negotiable or non-negotiable form of collateral would 
be relatively trivial in the sense that, at least at this stage of development, 
it is likely that bitcoin will rarely be used as collateral at all. In those 
cases where a creditor requires a debtor to post “cash collateral,” the 
parties would likely use conventional deposit accounts denominated in 
dollars or other conventional currencies where the law is fairly clear. 
Once again, this proves incorrect at further thought. As I will 
discuss, although it may or may not be true that debtors are unlikely to 
grant “first generation” security interests in bitcoins, if bitcoin is used as 
a cryptocurrency or as a payment system, then it will often become 
“second-generation” collateral—i.e. proceeds. In light of proceeds 
theory, the entanglement of bitcoin with Article 9 is inevitable.30 
B. Bitcoin. 
“Bitcoin” is an open source, peer-to-peer, decentralized protocol that 
can be used as a payment system without the use of intermediaries such 
as banks, brokers, credit card companies, etc. In some environments, it 
can act as a digital currency. As mentioned, creation of the original 
bitcoin is attributed to one or more persons who wrote under the name 
Satoshi Nakamoto. Today, the term bitcoin is sometimes used not only 
for the original, but also for the hundreds of other cryptocurrencies that 
                                                                                                             
29 See infra text at notes 85-109; See also George K. Fogg, The UCC and Bitcoins: 
Solution to Existing Fatal Flaw, BLOOMBERG BNA (April 1, 2015) http://www.bna.com/u
cc-bitcoins-solution-n17179924871; Bob Lawless, Is UCC Article 9 the Achilles Heel of 
Bitcoin?, CREDIT SLIPS (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2014/03/is-
ucc-article-9-the-achilles-heel-of-bitcoin.html#more. 
30 See infra texts at notes 87-109. 
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have been developed since then.31 For simplicity, unless the context 
indicates otherwise, I will use the word “bitcoin,” lower case, to refer 
generically to all cryptocurrencies and will refer to the protocol as the 
blockchain.32 I will refer to securities that are issued and transferred on a 
blockchain as “cryptosecurities.” 
Perhaps the most innovative aspect of bitcoin and its progeny is its 
distributed ledger—the blockchain.33 Like hand-to-hand money, bitcoin 
is peer-to-peer. That is, it can be transferred directly between two 
persons without the mediation of third-parties such as banks, brokers, 
credit-card companies, etc. Because bitcoin has no physical form, there 
must be some way of preventing double-spending the same bitcoin. This 
is solved by recording all transactions in every bitcoin in a public 
ledger—the blockchain.34 
The blockchain is decentralized. No central authority, like the Fed or 
MasterCard, maintains the system. Rather, it exists on the computers of 
all those who use the system and theoretically can be viewed by anyone. 
With respect to the original bitcoin, the verification or transactions and 
recording it on the blockchain is done by persons, so-called “miners”, 
who “voluntarily” offer their computing power in exchange for the 
chance of winning newly “minted” bitcoin.35 
                                                                                                             
31 As of the Spring of 2016, the Crypto-Currency Market Capitalizations website was 
quoting prices for 700 cryptocurrencies. CRYPTO-CURRENCY MARKET 
CAPITALIZATIONS (last visited June 14, 2016), http://coinmarketcap.com/all/views/
all/. 
32 There is disagreement as to if and when one should capitalize term “Bitcoin.” I tend 
towards the Wall Street Journal’s house style. Paul Vigna, BitBeat: Is It Bitcoin, or 
bitcoin? The Orthography of the Cryptography, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2014), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/03/14/bitbeat-is-it-bitcoin-or-bitcoin-the-orthograp
hy-of-the-cryptography/. 
33 Ali et al, Innovations, supra note 12; Ali et al., Economics, supra note 12. That is, 
rather than being recorded on a single ledger maintained by a single central authority—
whether the Fed, the Depositary Trust and Clearing Corporation, Visa or MasterCard, or 
whomever—it is maintained on the computers of numerous unrelated verifiers known, 
with respect to the original bitcoin, as “miners.” 
34 Bayern, supra note 13. 
35 Ali et al, Innovations, supra note 12; Ali et al., Economics, supra note 12; Davis, 
supra note 2, at 64. 
 Although bitcoin is a “fiat” currency in the sense that it is not backed by gold or any 
other commodity, Nakamoto’s original bitcoin was designed to replicate the supposed 
advantages of a gold system. The amount of gold on the earth is necessarily limited 
(although not all of it has been discovered or mined yet). A gold-based currency, 
therefore, limits a government’s ability to cause inflation by “printing” more money. 
Similarly, the original bitcoin program limits the maximum number of bitcoin that can 
ever be outstanding, thereby supposedly eliminating the risk of inflation (but not 
deflation). Nevertheless, to date, the value of the original bitcoin in U.S. dollars and other 
conventional currencies has fluctuated wildly. 
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Nakamoto’s original bitcoin cryptocurrency might be being undone 
by its own success. Although the original idea was that anyone with a 
computer could become a miner, over time the algorithms that miners 
need to solve have become increasingly difficult so that now a relatively 
small number of miners (which are no longer individuals, but well 
financed companies) with massive computing power dominate, that 
could theoretically collude to try to change the underlying program.36 
This arguably threatens the integrity of the fundamental principle of 
bitcoin—that it be decentralized and impervious to manipulation. 
Moreover, the bitcoin blockchain is becoming too big to fit on a personal 
computer.37 Consequently, some more recent developers of 
cryptocurrencies are using different means of maintaining the integrity of 
the blockchain.38 
Once again, these fascinating details are not our concern. What does 
interest us for commercial law purposes is that ownership of bitcoin is 
infinitely traceable and that the blockchain technology can be used for 
transactions other than the transfer of cryptocurrency. I will discuss in 
detail the use of the blockchain to create so-called cryptosecurities later 
in Part 3 of this Article.39 The blockchain could, potentially, be used to 
record any legal interest in any form of property. For example, it could 
                                                                                                             
 The term “mining” is a metaphor based on the California gold rush, at least at it 
exists in popular imagination. “Everyone” knew that there was gold in “them thar hills,” 
but not precisely where. Moreover, until it was discovered and claimed it was not owned 
by anyone. Claims could be made on a first-in-time basis, but discovery of a claim 
required a combination of luck and pluck. 
 With respect to the original bitcoin, the program periodically generates new bitcoin 
that can be claimed on a first-in-time basis. However, it takes a combination of chance 
and effort to do so. Specifically, new bitcoin can be discovered by devoting the time of a 
powerful computer to solve an algorithm. The first solver gets the bitcoin. Davis, supra 
note 2, at 69-70. The system depends on the equilibrium caused by the factors that (i) on 
the one hand, these algorithms take a lot of computer power to solve so that only a 
limited number of miners have any chance to claim a bitcoin, and (ii) on the other, 
solving the algorithms takes shear computer power rather than skill. This means that the 
system is a lottery with a limited number of players assuring that each player has a 
reasonable chance of winning occasionally, but no player can game the system so that he 
wins every round. The algorithms are designed to become increasingly difficult over time 
to keep the equilibrium in place as computing power increases. 
36 Stephanie Lo & J. Christina Wang, Bit Coin as Money?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
BOS., CURRENT POLICY PERSPECTIVES NO. 14-4 (Sept. 14, 2014). 
37 Id. 
38 For example, Ehereum, among others, uses a “proof of stake consensus” 
mechanism. See, e.g., Hans Lombardo, Synero, Ethereum Collaborating to Formalize 
Proof-of-Stake Protocol “Casper,” ALLCOINNEWS (July 25, 2015), http://allcoinsnews.co
m/2015/07/25/ethereum-synereo-collaborating-to-flest-out-proof-of-stake-protocol-
casper/. 
39 See infra text at notes 160-83. 
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become the basis for a more efficient nation-wide filing system to 
replace Article 9’s current, cumbersome state-by-state regime. 
The blockchain means that, although bitcoin is sometimes described 
as anonymous, it is in fact, at most, pseudonymous.40 To transfer bitcoin 
out of one’s digital wallet, the owner must enter in an account number, 
known as a public key, and a password or private key.41 Obviously, one 
could hide one’s actual identity behind these numbers, but sophisticated 
computer analyses have enabled large transactions to be tracked.42 
Moreover, although owners theoretically do not need intermediaries to 
transfer bitcoins, in fact, a variety of intermediaries and exchanges have 
developed. The Financial Crime Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) has 
advised that some of these intermediaries are MSB’s within the meaning 
of the Bank Secrecy Act subject to its requirements that they gather and, 
in some circumstances, report identifying information on their customers 
in order to prevent money laundering.43 In 2015, New York State 
adopted “bitlicense” rules with similar reporting requirements.44 
                                                                                                             
40 CRAIG K. ELWELL ET AL., BITCOIN: QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, AND ANALYSIS OF LEGAL 
ISSUES, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT 43339 (2015). A simple internet 
search will find numerous papers discussing how this can be done through transaction 
graph analysis. See, e.g., MICHAEL FLEDER ET AL. BITCOIN TRANSACTION GRAPH 
ANALYSIS (2014), http://people.csail.mit.edu/spillai/data/papers/bitcoin-transaction-grap
h-analysis.pdf. 
 Although transactions in bitcoin are not necessarily anonymous, users can arrange 
them so that they are nearly so. BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Anonymity (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2016). However, Bitcoin exchanges often fall within the definition of a 
Money Services Business (“MSB”) subject to extensive reporting requirements under the 
Bank Secrecy Act. See supra note 11. They also may be money transmitter businesses for 
the purposes of state licensing law. See id.; Charlie Shrem, co-founder of the now defunct 
BitInstant bitcoin exchange, had emphasized to me that although bitcoin transactions 
were more discrete than conventional electronic commerce, the goal of complete 
anonymity was illusory. Interview with Jeanne Schroeder (Jan. 23, 2013); interview with 
Charles Shrem, Co-founder of BitInstant, (Feb. 7, 2013). It is perhaps, therefore, ironic 
that he soon learned how true this the hard way when he was indicted for conspiracy for 
using bitcoin for money laundering by advising the founder of Silk Road how to get 
around BitInstant’s compliance rules. 
41 Lo & Wang, supra note 36; see also, Doguet, supra note 8; Kaplanov, supra note 8; 
Allen, supra note 8. 
42 Elwell et al., supra note 40; see also Jason Luu & Edward J. Imwinkelried, The 
Challenge of Bitcoin Psuedo-Anonymity to Computer Forensics, UC DAVIS LEGAL STUD. 
RES. PAPER SERIES, Res. Paper No. 462 (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2671921. 
43 Elwell et al., supra note 40. In May 2015, FinCEN imposed a $700,000 penalty on 
Ripple Labs, Inc., for violation of the Anti-Money Laundering provisions of the BSA. 
Ryan Tracy, Treasury Penalizes Ripple Labs, in First Action Against Virtual Currency 
Exchange, WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/treasury-penalizes-
ripple-labs-in-first-action-against-virtual-currency-exchange-1430864628?KEYWORDS
=ripple+labs. 
44 23 CRR-NY §§ 200 et seq (2015). The New York “bit-license” law goes further 
than the federal statute in that it also applies to anyone who controls, administers or 
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Nakamoto himself, and many of his libertarian and anarchist 
followers no-doubt were drawn to the relatively private nature of the 
original bitcoin cryptocurrency. In contrast, the financial industry, 
merchants and central banks that are interested in the commercial uses of 
the blockchain, probably care little about these issues. Indeed, as I have 
already implied its utility as a medium for trading cryptosecurities or as a 
filing or recording ledger depends precisely on the traceability of 
transactions. 
II. Money. 
Because its proponents refer to bitcoin as a form of digital currency, 
and because it is correctly treated as equivalent to money under the 
reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act, it is tempting to try to 
argue that one should be able to find a way to fit it into the U.C.C.’s 
defined word “money.” If so, bitcoin would be super-negotiable. 
Unfortunately, it is not. Consequently, bitcoin may not be able to meet its 
full potential as a cryptocurrency until the U.C.C. is amended. 
A. Negotiation. 
U.C.C.’s various property regimes reflect the familiar tensions 
between rights of possession and alienation. Although, the U.C.C. uses 
the term “possession” in an arguably retrograde way to mean the fact of 
physical custody of tangible things, jurisprudentially, the legal right to 
possession can be thought of (for our purposes) as the right of an earlier-
in-time claimant to exclude later-in-time claimants from an identifiable 
object.45 Both the competing values of possession and market alienation 
are essential to the functioning of capitalism. On the one hand, owners of 
property must be secure in their title. On the other hand, markets cannot 
function efficiently unless buyers can be assured that they are acquiring 
good title without having to engage in burdensome searches. Conflicts 
arise when one party, X, purports to transfer property that belongs to an 
innocent second party, O, to an innocent third party, P. It is clear that the 
double-dealing X has legal liability to make O and P whole by paying 
damages, but such fraudsters tend to leave the jurisdiction, are judgment 
                                                                                                             
issues a virtual currency. See Allen, supra note 8, at 38-41. Bitcoin service companies 
also frequently fall within the jurisdiction of state money transmitter licensing laws. See, 
e.g., Money Transmitter Law, http://moneytransmitterlaw.com/ (last visited Jan. 17, 
2016). State and federal licensing requirements are beyond the scope of this article.  
45 Note, the jurisprudential term “object” should not be confused with tangible things, 
but as anything that is not a subject, thought of that which is recognized as being capable 
of bearing legal rights and duties. As such, intangibles, like bitcoin, can be objects. 
JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY 
AND THE FEMININE 35-37 (1998) [hereinafter SCHROEDER, VESTAL]. 
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proof or both. Conveyancing and priority rules, therefore, are needed to 
decide which of two innocent parties, O or P, shall be recognized as the 
superior claimant and which shall bear the loss. 
Most conveyancing rules of the U.C.C. reflect the traditional 
compromise that favors possessory claims. That is, at least as a formal 
matter, the default rule is that first-in-time claimant prevails over a 
subsequent transferee.46 I refer to this as a derivation rule47 because the 
rights of a transferee derive from, and cannot exceed, those of the 
transferor. The harshness of derivation rules is modified by what I call 
“negotiation rules” designed to protect transferees in favored market 
transactions. That is, if the transferee can show he satisfies certain 
conditions, then he will take free and clear of the possessory rights 
(adverse claim) of the earlier-in-time claimant. These conditions 
typically require the transferee to meet an appropriate standard of good 
faith and to give value, but sometimes also require lack of notice, or 
specific market conditions. For example, under Secs. 2-403(2) and 9-
320(a) an entrustor of goods, and a secured party with a security interest 
in goods will prevail over a transferee of those goods unless the 
transferee can show that he is a buyer in the ordinary course of business, 
in which case he takes free of these adverse claims. 
In a few cases, however, the U.C.C. reverses this rule, adopting a 
default rule favoring subsequent transferees over prior claimants. For 
example, Sec. 9-332(a) provides with respect to money that: 
A transferee of money takes the money free of a security 
interest unless the transferee acts in collusion with the 
debtor in violating the rights of the secured party. 
I call such a rule “super-negotiation.” Note that under a negotiation 
rule, a transferee will lose unless she can establish that she has a favored 
state of mind (e.g. good faith), but under a super-negotiation rule she 
prevails unless the prior claimant can establish that the transferee had an 
affirmatively disfavored state of mine (i.e. she acted in collusion). 
                                                                                                             
46 I say “formal” in the sense that, as an empirical matter, the transferee will easily 
meet these tests in the vast majority of cases. For example, virtually all customers who 
buy merchandise in a department store will be buyers in the ordinary course who take 
free and clear of the security interests of the stores suppliers and inventory lenders; the 
vast majority of depository banks will qualify as holders in due course of their customer’s 
deposited checks, etc. 
47 I take my derivation/negotiation vocabulary from DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. 
JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL 
PROPERTY (2d. ed. 1987). “Super negotiation” is my idiosyncratic term that I adopted in 
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time? The Radical Reform of 
Secured Lending on Wall Street, 3 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 295, 351 (1994) [hereafter, 
Schroeder, Article 8]. 
16 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:1 
If bitcoin were “money” it would be entitled to the rule of Sec. 9-
332(a). Indeed, it could only truly function as money if it were governed 
by a similar rule because one of the hallmarks of money is precisely 
super-negotiability. That is, one reason why you will take a dollar bill as 
payment is that you can always be sure that no previous claimant could 
try to replevy it from you. Imagine what chaos would ensue if, instead, 
one needed to do a U.C.C. search before accepting cash. Unfortunately, 
this latter is the current regime that is applicable to bitcoins. Bitcoin 
transferees must yield to prior perfected security interests.48 
B. Conveyancing. 
Before I continue, let me make clear the purpose, and limits of, 
Article 9’s regime. Nakamoto, in “his” manifesto, and many of bitcoin’s 
most enthusiastic proponents, hope that bitcoin would eventually serve as 
currency, or money, that might replace, or even undermine, so-called fiat 
money created by governments. In this sense of the term, “money” is a 
very complex, and surprisingly under-theorized phenomenon. It is, 
among other things, a medium of exchange, unit of account and store of 
value.49 Physical currency or what central bankers call “hand-to-hand” 
                                                                                                             
48 See infra text at notes 85-109. Certain transferees of general intangibles do take free 
of unperfected security interests namely: 
A licensee of a general intangible or a buyer, other than a secured 
party of collateral other than tangible chattel paper, tangible 
documents, goods, instruments, or a certificated security takes free of 
a security interest if the licensee or buyer gives value without 
knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected. 
U.C.C. § 
49 See David Gray Carlson, Money as Measure, 33 CARDOZO L. REV, 2531 (2012); Lo 
& Wang, supra note 36. 
 The press has reported that one federal judge has held that bitcoin is money for the 
purposes of the Federal securities law. See, e.g., Jordan Maglich, Court Green-Lights 
Bitcoin Lawsuit; Rules Investment Constitutes ‘Securities’, FORBES (Aug. 7, 2013). This 
is the true, but only in a trivial sense. 
 In S.E.C. v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013) the SEC brought an 
anti-fraud action against a promoter for allegedly operating a Ponzi scheme in which 
victims would invest bitcoin on the promise that they would receive a greater amount of 
bitcoin in the future. The question at issue was not the securities-law status of bitcoin 
itself, but of the investment scheme. The promoter argued that the scheme was not a 
security under the Howey definition of “a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a 
person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from 
the efforts of the promoter or a third party”(emphasis added) on the grounds that 
investors were giving him bitcoin, and not money. S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 
293, 298-99 (1946). Specifically, Howey defines the term “investment contract” which is 
the catch-all category for an investment that does not otherwise fall within one of the 
other sub-categories listed in the term “security” in Sec. 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 
1933. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(a); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a(a)(10)-
3(a)(10). 
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money (notes and coins), is not money per se. Rather, hand-to-hand 
money is a token that both represents money and can also serve as a 
payment system for the transfer of money. As I will discuss below,50 the 
United States, deposit accounts—which are essentially electronic ledgers 
recording a bank’s debt owed to its depositors—have replaced hand-to-
hand money as the primary monetary token. Promoters who talk about 
bitcoin as money want it to serve all these roles—measure and store of 
value, unit of account, token of value and payment system. The most 
fervent bitcoiners, following Nakamoto, hope that bitcoin can prevent the 
inflationary risks that they associate with government issued fiat money 
or even undermine the hegemony of central banks and nation states. 
Although these are fascinating issues, they are not within the purview of 
the U.C.C. and will not concern us here. 
Article 9 is a property law regime. It sets forth certain rules 
governing the conveyancing of, and priority of competing claims to, 
personal property. Article 9 is specifically concerned with “security 
interests,” but this term can be misleading because it is not limited to 
“interests in personal property or fixtures which secure payment or 
performance of an obligation.”51 It also includes a number of other 
transactions including outright purchases of certain rights to payment, 
and consignments.52 
Article 9 characterizes different categories of property purely for this 
purpose. As already stated, there are good practical, as well as historical 
and customary, reasons for having different conveyancing rules for 
different types of collateral. Most importantly, the fact of physical 
custody is usually of utmost importance to issues of the relative rights of 
rival claimants to tangible collateral, and is often one of the conditions of 
a negotiation rule. Consequently, although the U.C.C. tends to elevate 
substance over practice, in the technical areas of conveyancing, form is 
of the essence. 
In context, it is clear that the U.C.C.’s definition of money—first 
promulgated in 1962—is intended to cover only hand-to-hand money. It 
does not even cover deposit accounts—the primary form that money 
takes within this country. Non-proceeds interests in deposit accounts 
                                                                                                             
 Judge Amos Mazzant correctly held that bitcoin was money for this very limited 
purpose. His terminology was unfortunate, however, insofar as it can be misconstrued as 
suggesting that the federal courts recognize bitcoin as currency. Rather, it would have 
been preferable for him to have noted that courts have long interpreted the Supreme 
Court’s reference to “money” in the Howey test to mean “money’s worth” or something 
of value. Otherwise fraudsters, like Mr. Shavers, could easily skirt the law by having 
investors pay in kind. 
50 See infra text at notes 62-64.  
51 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (2001). 
52 Id. 
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were actually expressly excluded from the scope of Article 9 until 
1999.53 
Grant Gilmore, Soia Mentschikoff, Karl Llewellyn and the other 
drafters of the U.C.C. could surely not have in their wildest imaginations 
dreamed of personal computers and the internet, let alone bitcoin, when 
they were working in the 1950’s. Consequently, not only does their 
definition of money not apply to bitcoin, it cannot be stretched to 
accommodate bitcoin—nor would we want it to. 
Although the most major revision of Article 9 promulgated by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law 
(“NCCUSL”) in 1999, with an effective date (for those states that 
adopted it) of 2001,54 fell well within the internet age, the original bitcoin 
only went online in 2009. So, if I were a betting woman, I would wager 
that not a single member of the drafting committee contemplated the 
creation of cryptocurrency. 
Moreover, the U.C.C.’s silence with respect to bitcoin is worse than 
the pre-1999 exclusion of deposit accounts from its scope. The original 
version of the U.C.C. recognized the “problem” of deposit accounts so it 
defined them, and then expressly excluded them from its scope (except 
insofar as they constitute proceeds). This allowed a common law of 
deposit accounts to develop.55 In contrast, the silence of today’s U.C.C. 
with respect to bitcoin means that it falls within the catchall definition of 
“general intangibles”—the least negotiable of all U.C.C. categories of 
property. Consequently, there can be no common law of security 
interests in bitcoin because Article 9 supplies the rules. 
This suggests that, for bitcoin really to take off as a payment system, 
let alone a currency, it may be necessary to amend the U.C.C. to add a 
super-negotiability rule for cryptocurrency 
                                                                                                             
53 In the sense Article 9 by its terms did not govern the grant of “first-generation” 
security interests in deposit accounts, which were left to the common law. Deposit 
accounts could, however, constitute proceeds, which I will refer to as “second-
generation” security interests.  
54 Relatively minor revisions to Article 9 were adopted in 2010. 
55 Pre-1999 Article 9 stated in Official Comment 7 to Sec. 9-104, that although 
“deposit accounts are often put up as collateral [s]uch transactions are often quite special, 
do not fit easily under a general commercial statute and are adequately covered by 
existing law.” The real-politic of the situation was almost certainly that, in the 1950’s 
when the original U.C.C. was being drafted, banks were happy to have a rule clarifying 
the rules with respect to security interests they took in property held by others, but were 
wary of applying this radical new regime to assets that they held. Because the support of 
the banking industry was necessary to get the legislation passed, deposit accounts were 
excluded. By 1999, however, when security interests in cash collateral had become 
common, banks were no longer satisfied with the vagaries of the common law and 
wanted clearer statutory rules. 
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C. The U.C.C.’s Definition of Money. 
The U.C.C.’s treatment of money and possession may seem 
strikingly unsophisticated from the perspective of the second decade of 
the twentieth-first century, unless one remembers the purpose of Article 
9, which is to be a non-exclusive conveyancing law for personalty. The 
use of the term “possession”—which is never defined—in context 
means, not the legal right to exclude later-in-time claimants, but the fact 
of physical custody—either directly by a party or its agent or attorning 
bailee. This terminology is arguably unfortunate.56 However, although 
U.C.C. is a common law code, to extend the term “possession” from the 
fact of physical custody to the right of exclusion would do great damage 
to the current statutory schema. 
Priority and other property disputes consist almost entirely about 
which of two or more parties has the right of possession (i.e. exclusion). 
Under the U.C.C.’s negotiation rules with respect to tangible property, 
the fact of physical custody is often one of conditions that a party must 
satisfy to obtain the right of exclusion. Consequently, to read the 
U.C.C.’s term “possession” to mean the right of possession, would make 
these negotiation rules hopelessly circular. Indeed, this would replicate 
the evil that Karl Llewellyn identified in the common law of sales that 
Article 9 was designed to remedy.57 
Sec. 1-201(a)(24) defines money as: 
[A] medium of exchange currently authorized or adopted 
by a domestic or foreign government. The term includes 
a monetary unit of account established by an 
                                                                                                             
56 I discuss the persistence of the conflation of the two conceptions of possession (the 
right to exclude and the fact of sensuous holding) even by theorists who claim to 
recognize the difference, in SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 45.  
57 The following is an abbreviated discussion of an analysis I set forth in full in Jeanne 
L. Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration: The Myth That The U.C.C. Killed “Property,” 
69 TEMPLE L. REV. 1281 (1996) [hereinafter Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration]. 
According to Llewellyn, under the common law, judges purported to decide property 
disputes in goods by identifying the claimant who had “title” to the goods. But, as 
Llewellyn forcibly argued in numerous works “title” is just another word for superior 
rights in the goods. Consequently, to say that the claimant who has title should win a 
dispute, is merely the truism that the winner should be the winner of the dispute. In order 
to come to the intuitively right decision in cases, Llewellyn argued, judges had to engage 
in complex linguistic gymnastics. Karl N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 
HARV. L. REV. 873 (1939) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Horseback]; KARL N. LLEWELLYN, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES (1930) [hereinafter Llewellyn, SALES]; 
Karl N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1939) 
[hereinafter Llewellyn, First Struggle]. 
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intergovernmental organization or by agreement between 
two or more countries.58 
At first blush, this seems to imply that the only impediment in having 
bitcoin treated as money is that, to date, no government has adopted it as 
its currency. This would seem to offer a golden opportunity for some 
small country, perhaps one that is already a tax haven, such as Andorra 
or the Cayman Islands, to adopt bitcoin or another digital currency as its 
medium (or one of its media) of exchange. Others before me have noted 
that no cryptocurrency currently constitutes money under this definition 
because of the adoption by a government requirement.59 I go further and 
argue that it could not be made into money for the purposes of the 
U.C.C. even if a government were to adopt it. 
The problem is that, although inartfully drafted, in context it is clear 
that the term is limited to physical, or “hand-to-hand,” currency. 
Moreover, as I discuss in the next section,60 characterizing bitcoin as 
money would have a perverse effect because security interests in money 
can only be perfected by physical custody. This would make it 
impossible to create a first-generation perfected security interest in 
bitcoin, which would limit its ability to serve as currency in sophisticated 
financial transactions because it could not effectively be used as cash-
collateral. 
The U.C.C.’s idiosyncratic limitation of money to hand-to-hand 
currency can be seen by the fact that it does not include in the definition 
the most common form in which money is held within this country—that 
is, deposit accounts. 
Bitcoin enthusiasts seem to presume that holding money in digital 
form is new. That is not the case. Rather, in this country money is 
usually not represented by any form of physical currency.61 
                                                                                                             
58 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(24) (2001). 
59 See, e.g., Fogg, supra note 29, at 2; Lawless, supra note 29.  
60 See infra text at notes 65-66. 
61 Modern American coins are supposed to be made of metals having a market value 
less than the stated denomination. However, according to the U.S. mint, in 2004 the cost 
of producing the cent and the nickel cost the government almost as much as the face 
amount to produce (.93 and 4.56 cents, respectively). U.S. Mint, http://www.usmint.gov/
about_the_mint/PDFs/2014-rd-biennial-report-appendix-2.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2016). 
Once again, because of high metal prices, the cost of producing the two coins reportedly 
exceeded their face value in 2006. Barbara Hagenbaugh, Coins Cost More to Make Than 
Face Value, USA TODAY (May 10, 2006), http://www.usatoday.com/money/2006-05-09-
penny-usat_x.htm. 
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D. Deposit Accounts 
Probably the most obvious (albeit, once again, indirect) indication 
that the defined term “money” as used in the U.C.C. is intended to cover 
only hand-to-hand money is the fact that Article 9 distinguishes “money” 
from “deposit accounts.” M1, the basic measure of U.S. money as 
defined by the Fed, is not “hand-to-hand” currency. That would be M0. 
Rather M1 is M0 plus checking and other demand deposit accounts 
maintained by banks and other financial institutions. Another measure, 
M2, tosses other less liquid accounts and intangibles into the pot.62 
The Fed reports that at any given time M1 is divided approximately 
half-and-half between deposit accounts and hand-to-hand currency.63 
This is misleading, however. Most American hand-to-hand currency is 
held abroad in countries with poorly functioning local currencies.64 
Within our borders, most “money” consists of checking and similar 
accounts with financial institutions. 
A deposit account is defined in Sec. 9-102(a)(29) as: 
A demand, time, savings, passbook, or similar account 
maintained with a bank. The term does not include 
investment property or accounts evidenced by an 
instrument. 
This definition, like that of “money” is surprisingly unhelpful, 
presupposing that the reader already knows what an “account maintained 
by a bank” is. To make a “deposit” into a checking account is to make an 
unsecured demand loan to a bank or other financial institution. The 
customer has no property interest in any funds owned by the bank. The 
bank merely agrees to repay the loan upon the customer’s order. 
                                                                                                             
62 M2, includes savings accounts and certain other time deposits as well. The Federal 
Reserve Board, Monetary Policy and the Economy 22, http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/
pdf/pf_2.pdf. Until 2006, the Fed also published a third even larger aggregate, M3. 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, The Money Supply, http://www.newyorkfed.org/ab
outthefed/fedpoint/fed49.html. 
 Nevertheless, as already mentioned, the U.C.C. still does not include such accounts 
in its definition of money, but relegates them to other categories such a “deposit account” 
and, perhaps, “general intangible.” U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) (2010). M2 and M3 also 
includes what the U.C.C. would characterize as “investment property.” U.C.C. § 9-
102(a)(49) (2010). 
63 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Money Stock Measures, Federal 
Reserve Statistical Release, (Jan. 14, 2016) http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/H6/c
urrent/H6.pdf. 
64 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, How Currency Gets into Circulation, (July 
2013), http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed01.html. 
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Consequently, a deposit account is a ledger that records the amount of 
this unsecured loan.65 
In any event, what is important for us is that, unlike the Fed, the 
U.C.C. distinguishes between currency represented by physical tokens 
and by book-keeping entries, only including the former (i.e. M0) in the 
definition of “money.” 
The fact that a “deposit account” is not “money” is evident from the 
fact that Article 9 repeatedly refers to it as separate category of collateral. 
For example, Sec. 9-102(b)(9) defines “cash proceeds” as “proceeds that 
are money, checks, deposit accounts, or the like.” Pursuant to Sec. 9-
312(b)(3) first-generation security interests in “money” can only be 
protected by possession understood as physical custody, whereas 9-
312(b)(1) provides that first-generation security interests in deposit 
accounts can only be perfected by “control.” Finally, although the super-
negotiation rule for funds transferred out of deposit accounts is almost 
identical to that for “money,” the two are set forth in different sections, 
namely Sec. 332(b) and 332(a), respectively. 
Consequently, the novelty of bitcoin is not that it is a digital rather 
than physical form of money, but that it can be held and transferred 
directly by an owner by registration on a decentralized blockchain. In 
contrast, deposit accounts exist only through an intermediary—a bank or 
                                                                                                             
65 A dwindling plurality of these orders are given in the traditional form of a physical 
check. A large majority in dollar amount of deposits, withdrawals and transfers are made 
electronically, even among consumers. Scott Schuh, Overview of the Survey of Consumer 
Payment Choice (SCPC) Program, FED. RESERVE BANK OF BOS., (May 6, 2010). 
Consequently, monetary transactions are usually book entries. Of course, even this may 
be a misleading metaphor in the sense that they no longer involve physical “books,” but 
electronic entries. 
 The law of deposit accounts is shockingly untheoretized. One thing is clear, 
however. The term “deposit” is a leftover from the medieval practice whereby merchants 
would literally deliver gold to bankers for safe-keeping. Today, one rarely makes deposits 
by delivering hand-to-hand money to a bank. And, regardless of how one delivers money 
to the bank, the “depositor” loses any property interest she once had in the money upon 
its “deposit.” Indeed, the customer has no property interest in any bank asset whatsoever. 
Although we are familiar with the image of bank vaults filled with dollar bills, banks hold 
only that amount of physical currency that they anticipate will be necessary to meet 
requests for cash withdrawals at ATM’s and in over-the-counter transactions. We 
intuitively know this when we laugh at the cartoon image of Scrooge McDuck playing in 
piles of physical currency. Pursuant to the Fed’s Regulation D (12 C.F.R. § 204) banks 
and other depositary institutions are required by state and federal law to keep reserves 
against depositary liabilities currently at ratios ranging from 0% to 10%. These 
“reserves” may consist either of vault cash or accounts maintained at Federal Reserve 
Bank. Reserve Requirements, BD. OF GOVERNOR’S OF THE FED. RES. SYS., (Dec. 16, 
2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reservereq.htm. In addition, under 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. §§ 1811 et seq.) ordinary accounts 
maintained by banks and certain other institutions are insured by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation up to $250,000. 
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similar financial institution.66 Even bitcoin held indirectly through an 
intermediary would not be deemed to be a deposit account under Article 
9. However, the customer and the intermediary could elect to have it 
treated as “investment property” under Article 8. 
III. Possession as Physical Custody. 
Another indication that the U.C.C. limits the term “money” to 
physical currency is that pursuant to Sec. 9-312(b)(3) a non-proceeds 
“security interest in money may be perfected only by the secured party’s 
taking possession.” This means that characterizing bitcoin as money 
under the U.C.C. would actually make it less able to function as a 
currency. It could not be used as collateral because it would be 
impossible to create a perfected first-generation security interest in it. 
The U.C.C. never defines the term “possession” but, as I have 
introduced, it is quite clear that it uses the term to mean the fact of 
physical custody. Obviously, only tangible things can be physically 
possessed. This can be seen in the enumeration of other types of 
collateral in which a security interest can be perfected by possession 
“negotiable documents, goods, instruments . . . or tangible chattel 
paper”67—all tangible things. Although Official Comment 3 to Sec. 9-
313 says that the section “does not define ‘possession’,” this is not an 
indication that it can be interpreted as something other than physical 
custody. Rather this comment refers to common law agency and other 
rules about when possession by a third party is deemed to be possession 
by a secured party. 
One category of tangible personalty is excluded from the list of 
collateral perfectible by possession: security interests in certificated 
securities can be perfected by “taking delivery.”68 This is not an 
exception to the general rule, however. Sec. 8-301(a) states that 
“delivery” of a certificated security only occurs when a person (either 
directly or through a third party) “acquires possession of the certificated 
security.” Official Comment 2 to this provision clarifies that the section 
is referring to “physical possession of certificates (emphasis added).” In 
other words, physical custody is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
of delivery. 
The U.C.C. uses the word “possession” over 100 times. In only two 
or three places is this modified by the word “physical.” Reading the 
U.C.C. as a whole, and understanding the customs and practices it 
                                                                                                             
66 A term that includes a “person engaged in the business of a banking and include as 
savings bank, savings and loan association, credit union, and trust company.” U.C.C. § 1-
201(a)(4) (2001).  
67  U.C.C. § 9-313(a) (2010). 
68  Id. 
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enshrines, the term “possession” is meant as physical custody of a 
tangible thing. To give a few examples: 
a. Holders in due course. The clearest (but still poorly drafted) place 
this can be seen, is in Article 3’s rules with respect to holders of 
negotiable instruments which are all based on physical possession of 
pieces of paper. Much of Article 3 revolves around the ability of “holders 
in due course” to take free of defenses (Sec. 3-305) and adverse claims 
(Sec. 3-306). To be a holder in due course one must, of course, first and 
foremost, be a “holder.” Sec. 1-201(b)(21) defines “holder” as a person 
in “possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer 
or to an identified person that if the person in possession,” certain 
persons in “possession” of a negotiable tangible document of title” and a 
“person in control of a negotiable electronic document of title.” Sec. 3-
201 defines “negotiation” as “transfer of possession, whether voluntary 
or involuntary, of an instrument by a person other than the issuer to a 
person who thereby becomes its holder.” Sec. 3-109(a)(1) defines a 
bearer instrument as one that is payable to “the person in possession.” 
Sec. 3-301, defining a “person entitled to enforce” an instrument 
distinguishes between holder, nonholders in possession, persons not in 
possession and persons in wrongful possession of and instrument. These 
provisions read, with an awareness of the common law of instruments 
indicates that the term “possession” means the fact of physical custody. 
b. Collateral in possession of persons other than the debtor. Sec. 9-
313(c), which governs when a secured party is deemed to possess 
collateral in the possession of a person other than the debtor, also 
implicitly uses the term “possession” to mean physical custody. This 
provision requires that the person in possession acknowledge that “it 
holds possession of the collateral for the secured party’s benefit.” This is 
reinforced by Official Comments 3 and 4, which clarify that this reflects 
the basic principle that a principal can possess property that its agent 
“holds.” 
c. Attachment. Attachment is Article 9’s term for the creation of a 
security interest.69 Sec. 9-203(b)(2) provides that one of the conditions of 
attachment for collateral that is not a certificated security can be satisfied 
by “possession of the secured party under Section 9-313 pursuant to the 
debtor’s security agreement.” Official Comment 2 clarifies that the four 
attachment formalities of Sec. 9-203(b) constitute “evidentiary 
requirements.”70 That is, as I shall discuss,71 under the doctrine of 
                                                                                                             
69  “A security interest attaches to collateral when it becomes enforceable against the 
debtor with respect to the collateral” U.C.C. § 9-203(a) (2010). 
70  Official Comment 5 to the 1972 revision of Sec. 9-203 referred to this as being “in 
the nature of a Statute of Frauds.” As I have discussed elsewhere, Sec. 9-203 is written as 
though there are three elements of attachment with the third element capable of being met 
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“ostensible ownership” physical possession is considered a relatively 
unambiguous way to publicize a claim of a property interest sufficient to 
evidence the existence of a contract, similar to having the debtor sign (or, 
in modern parlance, “authenticate”) a security agreement containing a 
description of the collateral.” 
The 1994 and 1999 revisions added a new alternative evidentiary 
formality: “control”—which is the effective power to exclude others. But 
control is limited to “deposit accounts, investment property, or letter-of-
credit rights.”72 I discuss control later in this Article,73 but would point 
out here that the contrast between the word “possession,” which is only 
used in connection with tangible things, and “control,” which is also used 
in connection with certain intangibles, is strong indication that the term 
“money” only refers to hand-to-hand money. 
d. Purchase Money Super-Priority. The super-priority rules for 
purchase money security interests under Section 9-324 (which only apply 
to goods and software) are dependent on the timing of when the debtor 
receives possession of the collateral. In the case of goods that are not 
inventory or livestock, under Sec. 9-324(a) for a purchase money 
financer to obtain super-priority over an earlier-in-time perfected secured 
party, it is sufficient if the purchase money financer perfects its security 
interest “when the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within 
20 days thereafter.”74 
Official Comment 3 to this section claims that “[n]ormally, there will 
be no question when ‘the debtor receives possession of the collateral’” 
before going on to discuss ambiguous cases. These examples indicate 
that possession must mean physical custody. The first example discussed 
is when a debtor takes possession of goods in stages, and then assembly 
and testing are completed (by the seller or debtor-buyer) at the debtor’s 
location. Under those circumstances, the buyer “takes possession” within 
the meaning of subsection (a) when, after an inspection of the portion of 
                                                                                                             
in four different ways. However, conceptually, I think that it is analytically clearer to 
think of there being four elements—1) the debtor must have rights in the collateral, 2) the 
secured party must give value, 3) the security interest must be granted pursuant to a 
security agreement and 4) the security agreement must be evidenced by one of four 
formalities. Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Security Interests Under Article 
8 of the Uniform Commercial Code 557, 577 (1990) [hereinafter Schroeder & Carlson, 
Security Interests]. 
71  See infra text at notes 81-84. 
72  U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(2)(D) (2010). 
73  See infra text at notes 152-53. 
74  In the case of inventory, the rules of Sec. 9-324(b) are more complex because the 
purchase money financier’s security interest must be perfected “when the debtor receives 
possession of the inventory” and must give notice to certain earlier-in-time perfected 
secured parties “within five years before the debtor receives possession . . . ” U.C.C. § 9-
324(b) (2010). 
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the goods in the debtor’s possession, it would be apparent to a potential 
lender to the debtor that the debtor has acquired an interest in the goods 
taken as a whole. (Emphasis added.) 
The second example is familiar to all commercial law professors. 
Although “true leases” and security interests in the form of leases are 
notoriously difficult to tell apart, the distinction is crucial for tax and 
accounting, as well as commercial and debtor-creditor law. One 
difference is, of course, that, to be enforceable against certain other 
claimants, a secured party must perfect its security interest but a lessor 
does not have to perfect its rights. 
This raises the hypothetical with which we love to bedevil our 
students. As described in Official Comment 3: “[A] person may take 
possession of goods as a lessee under a lease contract and then exercise 
an option to purchase the goods from the lessor on secured credit.” In 
this situation, how could the secured party meet the condition for 
purchase-money super-priority that it perfect its security interest within 
20 days of the debtor “receiv[ing] possession of the collateral” when the 
lessee has had physical custody of the leased property since the 
beginning of the lease? The comment suggests that the 20-day period 
only starts running when the secured interest attaches because only then 
are the goods deemed to be “collateral” defined in 9-102(a)(12) as “the 
property subject to a security interest . . . “ 
In both of these cases, the drafters of the comments are treating it as 
obvious that possession always requires physical custody, but there 
might be circumstances in which physical custody might be a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition of possession for the timing purposes of Sec. 
9-324. In other words, for the purposes of this section, the receipt of 
collateral can never occur before the debtor (or its agent) takes physical 
custody, but might occur later.75 
e. Repossession. One of the most basic rights of a secured party upon 
default is to “repossess” tangible collateral. Once again, although Sec. 9-
609 does not define what it means for the secured party to take 
possession, in context it is obvious that it is referring to physical 
possession. For example, the secured party is also given the right to 
proceed “without judicial process, if it proceeds without breach of the 
peace.” These provisions indicate that the drafters envision repossession 
as removal of physical custody. Probably more obviously, as an alternate 
to “taking possession” a secured party may “without removal, . . . render 
                                                                                                             
75  As further indirect evidence that Sec. 9-204’s reverences to the debtor receiving 
possession refers to physical custody, Sec. 2-103(1)(c) provides that, for the purposes of 
Article 2, “‘receipt’ of goods means taking physical possession of them.” Official 
Comment 2 clarifies that this is to make clear the distinction between receipt and 
delivery. U.C.C. § 9-204 (2010); U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(c) (2002).  
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equipment unusable and dispose of collateral on a debtor’s premises.” 
(Emphasis added.) As Official Comment 6 explains, “[i]n the case of 
some collateral, such as heavy equipment, the physical removal from the 
debtor’s plant . . . may be impractical or unduly expensive (emphasis 
added).” It further describes rendering equipment unusable is “in lieu of 
removal.” That is, “taking possession” means taking physical custody. 
f. Buyers in the Ordinary Course. Buyers in the ordinary course of 
business (“BIOC”) can take the goods free of free of the rights of a 
person who entrusts “possession of goods to a merchant who deals in 
goods of that kind” under Sec. 2-403(2) and free of security interests 
created by the buyer’s seller under 9-320. Sec. 1-201(a)(9) which defines 
BIOC’s clarifies that: 
Only a buyer that takes possession of the goods or has a 
right to recover the goods from the seller under Article 2 
may be a buyer in ordinary course of business. 
(Emphasis added.) 
To make this point even clearer, Sec. 9-320(e) provides that the 
BIOC rule of 9-320(a) “do[es]  not affect a security interest in goods in 
the possession of the secured party under Section 9-313.” As Official 
Comment 8 states, these provisions were added in large part to overrule 
the notorious Tanbro case in which a buyer was found to be a BIOC who 
took free and clear of a prior-in-time security interest perfected by filing 
despite the fact that, not only did the buyer not itself take physical 
custody of the collateral, the secured party remained in physical custody 
of it!76 
Once again, in context, “possession” implicitly means physical 
custody. This is also seen in Section 9-403(3)’s definition of 
“entrustment” as “any delivery, and any acquiescence in retention of 
possession.” 
To summarize, although the U.C.C. never expressly defines the word 
“possession” read in context, with a knowledge of commercial custom 
and practice, the term means the fact of physical custody not the legal 
right to exclude others. 
IV. Ostensible Ownership and “Control.” 
One could justifiably complain that conflation of possession with 
physical custody of tangible things, if ever justified in the past, is 
hopelessly unsophisticated and increasingly unworkable in the 21st 
century. Indeed, as I keep indicating, it conflates the fact of possession 
                                                                                                             
76  Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Mills, Inc., 350 N.E.2d. 590 (N.Y. 1976). 
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with the legal right of possession—the supposedly naive law person’s 
view of property that we try to wean our students from in the first year of 
law school. The right of possession should be thought of as the right of a 
claimant to exclude others from the object of property claimed. Taking 
custody of tangible objects is only one way of doing this. As the 
Supreme Court has recognized in Carpenter v. U.S.,77 when the object is 
intellectual property, possession should be thought of as the right of 
exclusive use.78 Similarly, the word “possession” as used in New York 
State’s Civil Practice Laws and Rules has been interpreted as meaning 
the right of exclusion, so that intangible property is capable of being 
possessed.79 Consequently, couldn’t we re-interpret the language of the 
U.C.C. better to serve our modern—or perhaps post-modern—economy? 
I completely agree as a matter of legal theory. Indeed, my first book, 
The Vestal and the Fasces: Hegel, Lacan, Property and the Feminine80 is 
an extensive argument as to why this should be the case from the 
position both of American law and Hegelian jurisprudence. I try to 
explain the tendency for this conflation through Lacanian psychoanalytic 
theory. I also argue that, because claims of possession are supposed to be 
good against “the world,” that is, a large class of third parties who do not 
necessarily have contractual or other relations with the claimant, as a 
condition of enforceability they must have be publicly manifest in a way 
to put third parties on notice. Following Hegel, I believe that although 
taking or retaining physical possession might be one way of doing this, it 
is not the most adequate way, as it can easily be thwarted by a thief. 
Accordingly, public recording one’s claim might be more reliable. The 
specific manifestation that will be recognized, however, needs to be 
specified by positive law. 
Nevertheless, in applying commercial law we are not free to reinvent 
the wheel, but must interpret a given statute that was drafted in a given 
historical context. To reinterpret the term “possession” as used in the 
U.C.C. to mean the right of exclusion would affect the over one-hundred 
places it is used implicitly to mean the fact of physical custody. 
To understand the schema of Article 9 we must consider the legacy 
of the doctrine of “ostensible ownership” and the concept of “control” 
                                                                                                             
77  484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
78  Although in Carpenter the Supreme Court seemed to think that the analysis of 
information as property was unproblematic (484 U.S. at 25-26), in fact, as I have 
discussed elsewhere, its proper characterization is highly contested. Jeanne L. Schroeder, 
Unnatural Rights: Hegel’s Theory of Personality and Intellectual Property, 60 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 453 (2006), reprinted in CHRISTOPHER, YOO, COPYRIGHT (CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW) (2011). 
79  Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Where Corporations Are: Why Casual 
Visits to New York Are Bad for Business, 76 ALBANY L. REV. 1141, 1165-66 (2013). 
80  See supra note 45. 
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first added to the U.C.C. in the 1994 Revisions to Article 8. The original 
doctrine of ostensible ownership,81 reflected in fraudulent conveyance 
law, was that any separation of claims of possession and physical 
custody was actually or constructively fraudulent vis a vis creditors of 
the non-possessory party unless it was “cured.”82 The proposition was 
that a potential creditor who saw a party in possession of goods could be 
fooled into thinking that he was the owner free and clear. If this was ever 
empirically the case in the 16th century when the doctrine was first 
propounded, it strikes me as absurd in the 21st where the separation of 
ownership and custody, and the ownership of intangible property that 
can’t be held in custody, are common, if not the norm.83 
The doctrine of ostensible ownership caused at least two problems 
for secured lending. Hypothecations—i.e. non-possessory security 
interests—and security interests in intangibles that cannot be physically 
possessed were problematic. The drafters of the U.C.C., seeking to make 
hypothecations and security interests in intangibles simple to create, 
wanted to solve the “problem” of ostensible ownership. They did this by 
allowing non-custodial security interests in many categories of collateral 
to be perfected by filing. Unfortunately, they continued to conflate the 
fact and the right of possession, and treated filing as an alternative to 
possession. I would say, in contrast, that all forms of perfection should it 
should be thought of legally recognized means of publicly manifesting or 
objectifying one’s claim of possession.84 
                                                                                                             
81  The following is an abbreviated discussion of an argument I make in Jeanne L. 
Schroeder, Some Realism About Legal Surrealism, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 461 
(1996) [hereinafter Schroeder, Realism]. 
82  Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An 
Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 175, 210 (1983). Baird & 
Jackson, perhaps the most vigorous defenders of ostensible ownership analysis in modern 
times, would have the law extend the U.C.C.’s perfection by filing requirements to other 
non-custodial property interests such as leases. 
83  Schroeder, Realism, supra note 81, at 485–97. Other critics who question its 
empirical assumptions are Charles Mooney, Jr., The Mystery and Myth of “Ostensible 
Ownership” and Article 9 Filing: A Critique of Proposals to Extend Filing Requirements 
to Leases, 39 ALA. L. REV. 683 (1988) and David M. Phillips, Flawed Perfection: From 
Possession to Filing Under Article 9—Part 1, 59 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1979). 
 The doctrine of ostensible ownership is most explicitly acknowledged in Sec. 2-402 
which, in recognizing the continuing validity of extra-code law, states: 
A creditor of the seller may treat a sale or an identification of goods 
to a contract for sale as void if as against him a retention of 
possession by the seller is fraudulent under any rule of law of the 
state where the goods are situated [except in certain cases involving 
merchant sellers]. 
U.C.C. § 2-402(2) (2002). 
84  Schroeder, Realism, supra note 81, at 506-08, 521-24, 533-34. 
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V. General Intangibles and the Law of Proceeds. 
If bitcoin is neither money nor a deposit account, it can only fall 
within the catchall category of “general intangibles,” which is defined as 
personal property that does not fall within any other category.85 This 
categorization has the potential of negatively affecting the marketability 
of bitcoin. 
This is because Article 9 has no negotiation rule for the buyers of 
general intangibles that are subject to a perfected security interest. That 
is, once a security interest in a general intangible is perfected, it survives 
even after multiple transfers to third parties. On the one hand, this may 
be more significant than it might appear at first blush, because if a 
cryptocurrency were to become widely used as either a currency or a 
payment system, it might implicate the proceeds provisions of Article 9. 
On the other hand, this problem might be mitigated by the practical 
problems a secured party might have in locating and garnishing bitcoin 
after transfer.86 
A. Proceeds. 
One of the novel aspects of Article 9 that distinguishes security 
interests in personal property from mortgages on real property, is the 
proceeds provisions that are now enumerated in Sec. 9-315. Sec. 9-
315(a) states that, except as otherwise provided in Articles 9 and 2: 
(1) a security interest . . . continues in collateral 
notwithstanding sale, lease, license, exchange or other 
disposition thereof unless the secured party authorized 
the disposition free of the security interest . . . ; and  
(2) a security interest attaches to any identifiable 
proceeds of collateral. 
Proceeds are defined in relevant part as “whatever is acquired upon 
the sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition of collateral.”87 
Sec. 9-315(c) provides that, if the security interest in the original 
collateral were perfected then the proceeds security interests will be 
temporally perfected. This temporary perfection will lapse 21 days later 
                                                                                                             
85   “General intangible” means any personal property, including things in action, 
other than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, 
documents, goods, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, 
letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other minerals before extraction. The 
term includes payment intangibles and software. 
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(43) (2010). 
86  See infra text at note 104-07. 
87  U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64)(A) (2010). 
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unless one of three conditions apply.88 The condition that is relevant for 
our discussion is 9-315(d)(1), which itself has three conditions: 
(A) a filed financing statement covers the original 
collateral; 
(B) the proceeds are collateral in which a security 
interest may be perfected by filing in the office in which 
the financing statement has been filed; and 
(C) the proceeds are not acquired with cash proceeds. 
1. Example: Buyers in the Ordinary Course. An example will show 
how this would work. Because Dell Computer purports to accept bitcoin 
for on-line purchases of computers, I will use a consumer computer 
company as my continuing example.89 Suppose that Debtor has granted a 
security interest in its inventory to its financer—a common practice.90 
Also assume that Debtor’s secured party has perfected its security 
interest by filing a financing statement91 with the Secretary of State of 
Delaware, Debtor’s jurisdiction of incorporation,92 that satisfies the 
                                                                                                             
88  U.C.C. § 9-315(c) (2010). In addition to the conditions of Sec. 9-315(d)(1) that I 
discuss in this section, these conditions are 
(2) the proceeds are identifiable cash proceeds; or 
(3) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected other than under 
subsection (c) when the security interest attaches to the proceeds or 
within 20 days thereafter. 
U.C.C. § 9-315(d) (2010). 
89  Dell’s bitcoin transactions are handled by Coinbase, a leading bitcoin wallet. Dell 
seems to have entered into what Coinbase calls an “instant conversion service.” That is, 
when a merchant’s customer wishes to pay in bitcoin, Coinbase will calculate the 
purchase price of the goods at the then prevailing conversion rate, and will transfer the 
customer’s bitcoin into the merchant’s account. Coinbase will then immediately buy the 
bitcoin from the merchant at the original sales price in dollars. The settlement of this 
dollar transfer can take two or three days. By doing so, Coinbase is protecting the 
merchant from any fluctuations in the conversion price. Merchant Transaction and 
Settlements, COINBASE USER AGREEMENT, (May 27, 2016), https://www.coinbase.com/leg
al/user_agreement#2.-merchant-transactions-and-settlement. See also infra text at notes 
94-97. 
90  Other analysts have raised this issue when a debtor has granted a blanket security 
interest in all of its property including general intangibles. See, e.g., Lawless, supra note 
29. In such a situation, I think it is more likely that a debtor might realize that the security 
interest includes cryptocurrency. 
91  Filing is the appropriate perfection formality for non-possessory security interests in 
goods. U.C.C. § 9-310 (2010). We are also assuming that all the elements of attachment 
in the inventory have been met. 
92  Although the “where-to-file” rules are extremely difficult to read, basically the law 
of the debtor’s location governs filing (U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (2010)) and a corporation is 
deemed located in its state of incorporation (U.C.C. § 9-307(e) (2010)). Delaware’s 
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requirements of Sec. 9-502(a) by indicating the collateral covered. A 
typical indication in a financing statement would be “all inventory, 
whether now existing or hereafter acquired.” 
When Debtor sells a computer and receives bitcoin in exchange, the 
security interest will in most cases not continue in the computer because, 
as an empirical matter, the consumer will usually qualify as a BIOC who 
takes the computer free of the secured party’s security interest under Sec. 
9-320(a). 
However, under the proceeds rules, the secured party will have a 
temporarily perfected security interest in the bitcoin received as 
proceeds. Moreover this security interests will continue to be perfected 
after 21 days because a security interest in general intangibles may be 
perfected by filing a financing statement with the Secretary of State of 
Delaware, Debtor’s state of incorporation. Note that this is the case even 
though the financing statement does not refer to general intangibles, let 
alone bitcoin. That is, 9-315(d) is an anomaly to the general rule that 
perfection by filing puts lenders and other potential claimants on notice 
by indicating the collateral covered by a secured party’s security 
interest.93 
                                                                                                             
U.C.C. provides that financing statements with respect to non-real-property-related are to 
be filed with the Secretary of State. Del. Code. Ann. tit. 6, § 9-501(a)(2). 
93  This is not as big a loophole to the notice-filing regime as it might seem, because it 
is mitigated by U.C.C. § 9-315(d)(1)(c), which provides that this section does not apply if 
there are intervening cash proceeds. That is, if a debtor sells collateral and receives cash 
proceeds—that is “money, checks, deposit accounts, or the like” (U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(9) 
(2010))—and uses the cash proceeds to buy something else—say equipment—the 
secured party will obtain an automatically attached and temporarily perfected security 
interest in the equipment as proceeds of proceeds. However, this time, the automatic 
perfection lapses after 20 days unless the financing statement correctly indicates the 
collateral. To maintain continuous perfection, the secured party must perfect the proceeds 
of proceeds by another means. For example, if the financing statement says “inventory,” 
the secured party would either have to take possession of the equipment or file a new 
financing statement indicating the new collateral. 
 Because of this, the anomaly can be expected to cause relatively little confusion as 
an empirical matter. When one sells inventory, for example, the usual proceeds that 
would be generated would be cash proceeds or various categories of rights to payments, 
such as accounts or chattel paper. U.C.C. Sec. 9-315(d), in effect, gives rival claimants 
notice that the indication of collateral in a financing statement automatically includes 
cash proceeds and rights to payment. The most common exception to this would be when 
the debtor makes a like-kind exchange, such as when a debtor, which is a car dealership, 
accepts a trade-in as part of the purchase price of a new car. As the trade-in will, in most 
cases, be placed in the dealership’s inventory, a financing statement that says “inventory” 
would satisfy the notoriety concern of perfection. The odd hypotheticals that haunt our 
casebooks, such where a car dealer swaps a car in inventory for a computer that is used as 
equipment (see, e.g., STEVEN L. HARRIS & CHARLES W. MOONEY, JR., SECURITY 
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY; CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 211 (5th ed. 
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2. Transfer of Bitcoin as Proceeds. So far, this is not problematic. 
Indeed, this is how Sec. 9-315 is supposed to work. It is the next likely 
transaction that raises issues. Debtor now takes its bitcoin proceeds and 
uses them to acquire something else. As a matter of fact, to date most 
sellers, like Dell, actually use bitcoin more as a gimmicky payments 
system and as a way of lowering transaction fees, rather than as a 
currency. By this I mean that Dell does not designate the price of 
computers in bitcoin, but in dollars. Nor does it hold significant amount 
of bitcoin at any time. If a consumer wishes to pay the price in bitcoin, 
the price in bitcoin will be calculated on checkout at the then prevailing 
market rate.94 
Dell processes its bitcoin sales through Coinbase, a bitcoin wallet 
and exchange.95 Coinbase will transfer bitcoin from a customer’s account 
into an account Dell maintains at Coinbase. Coinbase then immediately 
buys back the bitcoin from Dell by transferring to Dell an amount equal 
to the original purchase price of the goods (minus a fee) payable in 
dollars.96 The original security interest will automatically attach and 
perfect first to the bitcoin as proceeds and, upon Coinbase’s purchase of 
the bitcoin, to the dollars credited to Dell as “proceeds of proceeds.” The 
status of the proceeds of proceeds are beyond the scope of this Article.97 
                                                                                                             
2011)) is presumably deemed so unusual that the drafters decided that it could be 
tolerated as de minimis. 
94  According to Dell’s website, the price in bitcoin is only held open for 10 minutes. 
Bitcoin Terms and Conditions, Paying with Bitcoin, DELL http://www.dell.com/learn/us/e
n/uscorp1/campaigns/bitcoin-terms-and-conditions (last visited Jan. 16, 2016). 
95  Id. 
96  Money reporter John Davidson suggests that it might be the case that Dell never 
actually takes title to the bitcoin, but that Coinbase buys the bitcoin from Dell’s customer 
and then pays Dell the dollar value. Jacob Davidson, No, Big Companies Aren’t Really 
Accepting Bitcoin, MONEY (Jan. 9, 2015), http://time.com/money/3658361/dell-
microsoft-expedia-bitcoin/. 
 This seems to be incorrect. Coinbase’s user agreement states that it transfers 
customer’s a customer’s bitcoins into the merchant’s account. See supra note 89. What 
does seem to be correct, is that because Dell apparently uses Coinbase’s instant 
conversion service, Dell does not hold any significant amount of bitcoin and is not using 
it as either a unit of account or a store of value. 
 In contrast, Overstock indicates that it does hold 80% of the bitcoin it receives in 
payment. Davidson, supra. 
97  It is not clear how to characterize this so long as these “dollars” are held in an 
account at Coinbase. This would only be a deposit account if Coinbase were a “bank” 
defined in Sec. 1-201(a)(4) as “a person engaged in the business of banking an includes a 
savings bank, savings and loan association, credit union and trust company.” It is 
doubtful if Coinbase so qualifies, in which case Dell’s claim against Coinbase would 
broadly fall would be a general intangible. A possible alternative, discussed below (see 
infra text at note 149) that if Coinbase could qualify as a “securities intermediary,” then 
Dell and Coinbase could elect to have the funds in the account treated as a “financial 
asset.” 
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Our concerns are the rights of the bitcoin wallet that purchased 
Debtor’s bitcoins. Under Sec 9-315(a), the security interest continues in 
the bitcoins unless the secured party consents to the transfer or an 
exception applies. The problem is that there is no negotiation exception 
for buyers of general intangibles. Moreover, the security interest will 
continue in the bitcoins when the bitcoin wallet sells them to another 
party, and when that party transfers them ad infinitum. 
3. Negotiation Rules for General Intangibles. Article 9 does have 
one negotiation rule for perfected security interests in general 
intangibles. Unfortunately, it would not apply to buyers (or donees) of 
bitcoin. Sec. 9-321(b) provides that” 
A licensee in ordinary course of business takes its rights 
under a nonexclusive license free of a security interest in 
the intangible created by the licensor, even if the security 
interest is perfected and the licensee knows of its 
existence. 
Obviously, as noted in Official Comment 2, this is based on the long-
standing rule of 9-320(a), discussed above, protecting buyers of goods in 
the ordinary course of business.98 
The obvious problem here is that the person acquiring the bitcoin 
from Debtor in my hypo—or for that matter, in any other transaction in 
which bitcoin is being used as a cryptocurrency or payment system—is 
not a “licensee.” What this section seems to contemplate are transactions 
in software or other intellectual property which are also included in the 
catchall category of “general intangibles.” Except when the owner of 
such intellectual property is selling or otherwise transferring 100% of its 
interest, a transferee will be a licensee of the property. For example, 
although I might speak colloquially of “buying” and downloading the 
newest version of WordPerfect for my computer, or an app for my 
phone, I am actually acquiring a non-exclusive license in the software or 
app. Sec. 9-321(b) assures me that if Corel were to grant a security 
interest to a secured party in its rights to WordPerfect, and then defaults 
on the secured transaction, I do not need to worry that the secured party 
                                                                                                             
98  “licensee in ordinary course of business” means a person that becomes a 
licensee of a general intangible in good faith, without knowledge that the 
license violates the rights of another person in the general intangible, and in the 
ordinary course from a person in the business of licensing general intangibles 
of that kind. A person becomes a licensee in ordinary course if the license to 
the person comports with the usual or customary practices in the kind of 
business in which the licensor is engaged or with the licensor’s own usual or 
customary practices. 
U.C.C. §. 9-321(a) (2010). 
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would have the right to remove my copy of WordPerfect on my 
computer. 
4. Adequacy of Filing after Transfer. Those who are not intimately 
familiar with Article 9’s transfer regime, might assume that the financing 
statement that perfected the security interest granted by the original 
debtor should not be adequate to perfect a security interest once the 
collateral is owned by a subsequent transferee with a different name and 
located in a different jurisdiction. After all, if a creditor of the transferee 
were to search the public record in the transferee’s name in the 
transferee’s jurisdiction it would not be able to learn of the existence of 
the continuing security interest. This assumption is incorrect. To 
understand why we need to take a detour through the perfection 
formalities of Article 9. 
Sec. 9-502 sets forth the “big three” requirements for information 
that must be set forth in a financing statement: the name of the debtor; 
the name of the secured party or its representative; and an indication of 
the collateral. We have already discussed the anomaly that in some 
circumstances a financing statement is adequate to perfect a security 
interest in proceeds despite the fact that the description is no longer 
accurate. More important for our discussion is the fact that a financing 
statement may remain adequate to perfect a security interest after 
disposition despite the fact that the name of the debtor is incorrect. 
Sec. 9-507(a) provides: 
A filed financing statement remains effective with 
respect to collateral that is sold, exchanged, leased, 
licensed, or otherwise disposed of and in which a 
security interest . . . continues, even if the secured party 
knows of or consents to the disposition. 
Sec. 9-508(c) further clarifies that the provisions of Article 9 relating 
to when the name of a debtor becomes seriously misleading so that a 
financing statement needs to be amended to not “apply to collateral as to 
which a filed financing statement remains effective against the new 
debtor under 9-507(a).” Rather Sec. 9-508 anticipates circumstances in 
which the original debtor changes its name or undergoes a change in 
business structure, such as a merger. 
This would seem to be an even greater deviation from the principle 
that perfection is supposed to put potential creditors, purchasers and 
other persons on notice of the existence of a security interest. Here, 
checking the public file under the transferee’s name will not reveal the 
existence of any security interest. As Official Comment 3 to Sec. 9-
507(a) states: 
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any person seeking to determine whether a debtor owns 
collateral free of security interests must inquire as to the 
debtor’s source of title and, if circumstances seem to 
require it, search in the name of a former owner. 
This rule, apparently, is designed to mediate between the necessarily 
inconsistent policies of notice to the world and protection of secured 
parties. The concern is that it would be too easy for a dishonest debtor to 
defeat the rights of its secured lender if it could unilaterally destroy 
perfection by transferring collateral to another person. Historically, this 
rule probably did not overly burden potential creditors or purchasers 
because, empirically, the most likely transaction involving collateral that 
can both be perfected by filing and also not be protected by a negotiation 
exception (so that the security interest would continue despite 
disposition) would be the resale of used equipment. If so, Sec. 9-507(a) 
would only require a relatively small class of potential buyers and 
creditors to include an investigation of provenance, in addition to a 
search of the files, as part of their due diligence in deciding whether to 
buy, or make a loan secured by, used equipment. This seems even more 
the case when one considers that large swaths of equipment that would 
expected to retain sufficient value after transfer to justify tracing—for 
example, motor vehicles, airplanes and boats—are subject to extra-
U.C.C. registration systems under which title can be traced. 
5. Example: Continuous Perfection Despite Transfer. Let’s return to 
our example once more. Debtor has granted a security interest in its 
inventory to secured party, “Bank.” Bank files a financing statement with 
the Secretary of State of Delaware indicating the collateral as 
“inventory” and identifying the debtor as “Debtor Inc.,” its corporate 
name as specified in its charter. Assuming that the other elements of 
attachment and perfection have been met, Bank would have a perfected 
security interest in Debtor’s current inventory. 
Debtor then sells computers and related equipment to a small 
business that pays in bitcoins having a then market value of $20,000 
dollars. As discussed in the last section, the buyer will almost certainly 
be a BIOC that will take free of Bank’s security interest. Bank, however, 
will now have a perfected security interest in the $20,000 of bitcoin (the 
“encumbered bitcoin”). 
Debtor immediately turns around and sells the encumbered bitcoin to 
Dealer for $20,000 (minus an exchange fee). Because there is no 
negotiation exception for general intangibles, Bank still has a perfected 
security interest in the encumbered bitcoin in Dealer’s “hands.”99 
                                                                                                             
99  Bank now also has a security interest in the funds in the deposit account as cash 
proceeds of the encumbered bitcoin, but that is beyond the scope of this article. 
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Dealer now takes the encumbered bitcoin and sells it to Transferee. 
Transferee also takes the encumbered bitcoin subject to Bank’s perfected 
security interest. This will continue ad infinitum until Bank’s original 
financing statement lapses in the ordinary course despite the fact that the 
financing statement continues to list Debtor Inc. as the debtor, indicates 
that the collateral is inventory, and is filed in Delaware regardless of 
where the owner of the encumbered bitcoin is located at least for a 
substantial period of time. As discussed in paragraph 7, the somewhat 
good news is that perfection will eventually lapse if the location of the 
new debtor is different from that of the original Debtor. 
6. Future Advances. This rule is particularly harsh when one 
considers Article 9’s future advance rules. For example, in my recurring 
hypothetical, imagine that on day 1 when it files its financing statement, 
Bank has only lent $5,000 to Debtor. Presume, also, that the security 
agreement between Debtor and Bank provides that the collateral shall 
secure all indebtedness whether existing now or incurred in the future. 
After Dealer sells the encumbered bitcoin to Transferee, Bank lends 
Debtor an additional $1 million dollars. The encumbered bitcoin secures 
the entire amount of this second loan. Moreover, in the event of a 
default, Bank has no duty to marshal assets and foreclose first on other 
collateral still held by Debtor, but may proceed against Transferee to 
foreclose on its encumbered bitcoin. 
Sec. 9-323, which mitigates the harshness of the future advance 
priority rules, will give little solace to the potential bitcoin market. It 
contains exceptions for rival secured parties when the security interest is 
perfected by automatic or temporary perfection, for lien creditors, for 
buyers of receivables, chattel paper, payment intangibles or promissory 
notes, for consignees, and for buyers and lessees of goods. One class of 
transferees who are notably absent from this list of protected transferees 
are buyers of general intangibles that are perfected by filing! That is, in 
my hypo, poor Transferee would find that its encumbered bitcoin is 
security not just for the $5,000 of secured loans outstanding on the day it 
acquired the encumbered bitcoin, but the entire $1,005,000 that Debtor 
owns Bank. 
7. Lapse Upon Change of Jurisdiction. Some relief for purchasers of 
general intangibles is offered by Article 9’s baleful choice-of-law rules 
for filing if the purchaser is deemed to be located in a different 
jurisdiction from the original debtor. This is because perfection by filing 
in the original jurisdiction will eventually lapse if not reperfected in the 
new jurisdiction. The relief this might offer may, unfortunately, be 
limited by the odd phenomenon of what I call “rolling continuous 
perfection” that I discuss in the next subsection. 
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The labyrinth that is Article 9’s filing rules results from the fact that 
filing is made at the state, and not the national level. Although vastly 
simplified in the 1999 revisions, these rules remain fairly mysterious to 
the neophyte since they are located in Article 9’s confusingly drafted 
choice-of-law rules. Despite the opacity of the statutory language, 
however, the basic rule for general intangibles is fairly clear. Pursuant to 
Sec. 9-301(1), “while a debtor is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of 
that jurisdiction governs perfection, . . . ” For example, if a debtor is 
located in Delaware, then Delaware law governs perfection of a security 
interest in a general intangible. If one were to consult Delaware’s version 
of the U.C.C. one would find that in order to perfect a security interest in 
a general intangible, one would have to file a financing statement with 
the Secretary of State of Delaware.100 We will discuss what it means for a 
debtor to be located within a jurisdiction shortly. 
The rules as to when perfection of collateral transferred to a new 
debtor lapse fall within Sec. 9-316, which governs changes in governing 
law. Specifically Sec. 316(a) provides: 
(a) A security interest perfected pursuant to the law of 
the jurisdiction designated in Section 9-301(1) . . . 
remains perfected until the earliest of: 
(1) the time perfection would have ceased under the 
law of that jurisdiction; 
(2) the expiration of four months after a change of 
the debtor’s location to another jurisdiction: or 
(3) the expiration of one year after a transfer of 
collateral to a person that thereby becomes a debtor 
and is located in another jurisdiction. 
Secs. 9-316(h)(2) and (i)(2) tells us that if the security interest is not 
reperfected before such times, then “it becomes unperfected and is 
deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser of the 
collateral for value.” 
Understand what this means in our example. Day 1, Debtor sells 
encumbered bitcoin to Buyer. Buyer takes the bitcoin subject to the 
security interest granted by Debtor, and remains so subject even after 
perfection lapses. Consequently, if Debtor defaults in its secured 
obligation, Secured Party can foreclose on the encumbered bitcoin if it 
were still owned by Buyer. If perfection lapses under these provisions, 
however, then secured parties, buyers and other persons who might 
                                                                                                             
100  Del. Code. Ann. tit. 6, § 9-501(a)(2). 
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purchase the encumbered bitcoin will take free of the security interest.  
Donees and lien creditors who acquire the encumbered bitcoin before the 
lapse of this period would take subject to the security interest, however. 
Let us look at the provisions of 9-316(a) seriatim. Subsection 9-
316(a)(1) is simple. The basic rule of Sec. 9-515(a) is that a financing 
statement has a five-year duration, unless it is extended by filing a 
continuation statement. 9-316(a) merely clarifies that the effectiveness of 
a financing statement is not extended upon transfer of the collateral. For 
example, if a financing statement were filed against Debtor, with respect 
to collateral on July 1, 2011, it will expire on June 30, 2016 unless a 
continuation statement is filed before the termination date. If Debtor 
transferred the encumbered bitcoin to buyer on June 29th, then the 
financing statement will expire on the next day, and will not be entitled 
to the grace periods of the other two subsections of 9-316(a). 
Sec. 9-316(c) also seems fairly straightforward (although I will add a 
complication in the next subsection). Suppose that the encumbered 
bitcoin is perfected by the filing of a financing statement against Debtor 
in the state of Delaware (its location) on July 1, 2016. On July 2, 2016, 
Debtor sells the encumbered bitcoin to Buyer, who is located in New 
York. Unless the security interest is reperfected in New York by July 1, 
2017, the security interest will not merely become unperfected after that 
date, it will retroactively lapse, but only with respect to purchasers who 
acquire the encumbered bitcoin for value. 
Sec. 9-316(a)(2) might, at first blush, not seem to be relevant to our 
hypothetical since it refers to changes in the debtor’s location, not 
transfer of the collateral. This is not quite correct, but to understand why, 
one must look to Article 9’s definition provisions. Sec. 9-102(a)(28)(A) 
defines “Debtor” as “a person having an interest, other than a security 
interest or other lien, in the collateral, whether or not the person is an 
obligor.” In other words, the term “debtor” is not limited to the original 
person who entered into the security agreement, but also includes any 
person who subsequently acquires encumbered collateral from the 
original debtor. 
To go back to our example, on July 2, Debtor sells the encumbered 
bitcoin to Buyer who, this time, is located in Delaware at the time of the 
purchase. The one-year limitation of 9-316(a)(3) would not apply, the 
financing statement would remain in effect, and the security interest 
would remain perfected for the balance of the financing statement’s five-
year duration. If, however, Buyer were to change its jurisdiction by 
moving to New York on September 1, 2016, then Sec. 9-316(a)(2)’s 
four-month period would begin to run and the financing statement would 
expire on December 31, 2016 (unless the security interest is reperfected 
during this period).  
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But for the strange possibility of continuous “rolling continuous 
perfection” to which I will turn shortly, Sec. 9-316 would seem to have 
the possibility of freeing up encumbered bitcoin in a significant 
percentage of cases. This is because the transferee will often be located 
in a different location from the original debtor against whom a financing 
statement is filed. 
The rules for determining the location of a debtor are set forth in Sec. 
9-307 and are fairly clear, at least with respect to U.S. persons. 
Businesses that are formed by filing with a state—such as corporations, 
limited partnerships and limited liability companies101—are located in 
their state of organization.102 Consequently, in my continuing example, 
Debtor, a Delaware corporation, is located in Delaware, and Delaware’s 
U.C.C. provides that financing statements must be filed with the 
Secretary of State of Delaware. Sec. 9-307(b)(1) provides that 
individuals are located at their principal residence, and other businesses 
are located at their chief executive offices. The rules for foreign 
businesses are somewhat more complicated but do not concern us now. 
The point is, that if encumbered bitcoin were to be used to pay for goods 
and services, it is highly likely that the recipient of the bitcoin would, 
under these rules, often be located in another jurisdiction,103 in which 
case it would seem like perfection should lapse in one year. 
8. Rolling Continuous Perfection. Unfortunately, what the U.C.C. 
gods giveth, they often taketh away. If bitcoin would ever truly become a 
payment system, the lapsing perfection rule of Sec. 9-316 that I just 
described could be undone by what I will call the “rolling continuous 
perfection” aspects of Sec. 9-316’s grace periods. 
This is an oddity that, until I started analyzing bitcoin, I had thought 
only posed problems under the pre-1999 versions of Article 9, which 
generally provided that the filing location for the perfection of security 
interests in goods was the state where the goods were physically located. 
I used to push my students in their understanding of the filing regime by 
                                                                                                             
101  U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(71) (2010). 
102  U.C.C. § 9-307(e) (2010). 
103  One might be tempted to worry that, insofar as businesses are often the counterparty 
in financial and other business transactions that therefore, transferees of bitcoin will 
likely be located in Delaware, the premier state of incorporation. This is probably 
incorrect as an empirical matter. According to The Wall Street Journal, 54% of public 
companies are incorporated in Delaware, although the percentage has been rising over the 
last decade. Liz Hoffman, Dole and Other Companies Sour on Delaware as Corporate 
Haven, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 2, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/dole-and-other-compani
es-sour-on-delaware-as-corporate-haven-1438569507. But this means that a large number 
of publicly traded corporations are elsewhere. Moreover, in my experience, the vast 
majority of private corporations, L.P., and L.L.C.’s are organized in the states where their 
primary place of business is located, i.e. not Delaware. 
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proposing hypotheticals, based on some early cases, where collateral was 
repeatedly relocated between different jurisdictions. My hypotheticals 
were designed as exceptions to prove the rule—that is, bizarre anomalies 
that illustrated how the rule nevertheless worked smoothly in the vast 
majority of case. Unfortunately, the so-called exception could, in fact, be 
common in the case of bitcoins if it were ever actually to become a 
payment system. 
Let us go back to my hypothetical. Debtor grants a security interest 
in its inventory pursuant to an authenticated security agreement 
containing an appropriate description of the collateral. On January 2, 
2016, Secured Party perfects by filing a financing statement in Delaware 
(Debtor’s state of incorporation) naming Debtor as debtor and indicating 
the collateral as “inventory.” Debtor sells inventory in exchange for 
bitcoin. The security interest automatically attaches and perfects in the 
bitcoin as proceeds. On July 1, 2016, Debtor uses the encumbered bitcoin 
to purchase goods and services from Buyer. Buyer takes the encumbered 
bitcoin subject to Secured Party’s perfected security interest. However, 
because Buyer is located in New York, perfection of the security interest 
is scheduled to lapse on June 30, 2017, pursuant to Sec. 9-316(a)(3). 
However, on June 29, 2017, Buyer transfers the encumbered bitcoin to 
Transferee, a purchaser for value, which is located in New Jersey. One 
might suppose that perfection of the encumbered bitcoin, now owned by 
Transferee, will lapse on June 30, 2017. This is incorrect. The copula of 
Sec. 9-316(a) refers to the continuance of a security interest that is 
originally perfected, and the three rules of the subsections refer to when 
the perfection lapses. Consequently, on June 29, 2017, when Buyer 
transfers the encumbered bitcoin to Transferee, the security interest 
remains perfected because the grace period of Sec. 9-316(a)(3) had not 
yet expired. Consequently, pursuant to the express language of Sec. 9-
316(a)(3), upon the transfer to Transferee, a new one-year grace period 
would begin running. The same thing would happen every time a new 
transfer occurs until the fire-year life of the original filing finally elapses. 
On the one hand, if bitcoin were ever to become generally used as a 
“currency” or payment system, we would expect to transfers—and, 
therefore, the recommencement of the Sec. 9-316(a) to become the norm, 
not the exception, so that proceeds security interests in bitcoins as 
proceeds would potentially limit their negotiability and, therefore, utility 
as a payments system. On the other hand, these limitations on 
negotiability would be expected to negatively affect the utility of bitcoin 
as a currency or a payment system. 
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B. Implications. 
The bitcoin neophyte might be tempted to think that this is only a 
theoretical problem. Aren’t bitcoins famously anonymous? Won’t 
encumbered bitcoins simply disappear into cyberspace after they are 
transferred? This implies that the secured party might continue to have a 
security interest in an encumbered bitcoin, but it will never be able to 
find it as a practical matter. 
This is a serious misconception. As Blythe Masters asserts, one of 
the advantages of using the blockchain protocol for the settlement of 
financial transactions is that bitcoin is more, not less transparent than 
conventional payment systems. Hand-to-hand money is rarely 
traceable—most bills are not “marked” and only Scrooge McDuck 
memorizes the serial numbers of his dollar bills. Funds deposited into 
commingled deposit accounts are not even theoretically traceable—so-
called tracing “rules” are actually equitable tracing “fictions.” Despite 
our inadequate and outdated vocabulary for traditional monetary 
transactions, there is no such thing as an identifiable dollar held in a 
deposit account. 
In contrast, bitcoin transactions are infinitely traceable.104 As 
discussed above,105 the defining characteristic of all bitcoin “currencies” 
is the blockchain, which prevents counterfeiting and double-spending. 
Each bitcoin transaction is unique and identifiable and all transfers are 
recorded. Accordingly, ownership in bitcoin is, therefore, not truly 
anonymous, but can be pseudonymous. Although the secured party may 
have difficulty identifying many owners of an encumbered bitcoin, it will 
always be able to identify the encumbered bitcoin itself. Consequently, if 
the original debtor defaults on the secured transaction, and the 
unencumbered bitcoin ever comes into the hands of an identifiable 
transferee, then the secured party would have the right to “repossess” it. 
Consequently, one of the advantages of using the blockchain for the 
transfer of value is that does away with the confusing metaphors of 
tracing rules that apply to deposit accounts and replace them with the 
reality of actual tracing.106 
                                                                                                             
104  Casey, supra note 19. 
105  See supra text at notes 34-42. 
106  Some, including prominent bitcoin lawyer and proponent, Patrick Murck, have 
suggested that bitcoins are not traceable after disposition because of its very technology. 
https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/luncheon/2015/10/Murck. To oversimplify his 
argument, each bitcoin is unique in the hands of each owner so that although bitcoin 
transfers are traceable, the bitcoin itself is not because it is not a coin. I agree with 
George Fogg (supra note 29, at 3), that a court would not accept this argument because 
the value transferred can be readily identified through traditional equitable tracing 
principles. 
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Moreover, as discussed above,107 both FinCEN, under the Bank 
Secrecy Act, and New York State, under its so-called bit-license rules, 
impose informational gathering and reporting rules with respect to 
bitcoins that will increase the practical identifiability of bitcoin owners. 
For example, Coinbase, the bitcoin wallet that Dell uses, is registered 
with FinCen as a Money Service Business.108 Here there may be a 
chicken-and-egg issue. The more that bitcoin becomes a mainstream 
payment system, the more likely that the ownership of bitcoin will be 
identifiable, making Article 9’s proceeds rules more problematic. 
However, the problems of Article 9’s proceeds rules may be a factor in 
keeping bitcoin from becoming a mainstream payment system. 
Accordingly, for bitcoin to meet its potential, it might be necessary to 
amend Article 9 to create a super-negotiation rule for cryptocurrency 
analogous to the super-negotiable regimes of money, deposit accounts 
and investment property.109 
VI. Amending Article 9. 
A. Security Interests. 
Article 9 would have to be amended to add a super-negotiation 
regime if bitcoin were to be truly successful as a cryptocurrency and a 
payment system. This would require four primary elements: (i) a 
definition of a cryptocurrency; (ii) the super-negotiation rule itself; (iii) a 
definition of “control” with respect to cryptocurrencies; and (iv) priority 
rules with respect to security interests in cryptocurrencies.110 
1. Definition. Definition of a cryptocurrency could be a delicate 
matter.111 Although the blockchain was originally created to prevent the 
                                                                                                             
 Murck also thinks that courts should find that transferred bitcoin become 
disencumbered upon transfer by common law analogy to the law of deposit accounts, 
investment securities (which, I believe he mis-characterizes, applying the rule of Sec. 8-
502 applicable to securities entitlement to certificated securities), and the notoriously 
inconsistent common law of the confusion of goods. As I indicate throughout this article, 
although I agree with his intuition that it would probably be a good commercial policy for 
society to adopt a negotiation or super-negotiation rule for cybercurrencies, the problem 
is that the law of general intangibles is governed by the U.C.C. and not common law 
principles. This is why I argue that the U.C.C. should be amended. 
107  See supra text at notes 43-45. 
108 See generally MSB Registrant Search Web Page, FINCEN, http://www.fincen.gov/
financial_institutions/msb/msbstateselector.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2016). 
109  See infra text at note 110-16. 
110  Numerous conforming amendments would also be needed to other provisions in 
Article 9 to reflect these changes. For example, Sec. 9-203(b)(3)(D) should be amended 
to add control of a cryptocurrency as a permitted attachment formality. 
111  FinCEN, in its “Guidances,” uses the term “decentralized virtual currency.” See, 
e.g., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FIN-2013-G001, 
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counterfeiting and double-spending of bitcoin, its potential uses are not 
so limited. As I discuss in Part 3, it can be used for the issuance and 
transfer of uncertificated securities. Others foresee yet other applications. 
For example, Ethereum is exploring the development of applications as 
diverse as self-executing smart contracts and ownership registration 
systems for assets.112 Consequently, the drafters would have the difficult 
task of drafting a definition of cryptocurrency that is flexible enough to 
include the evolution of future payment systems, but not so broad as to 
sweep in other uses of the blockchain which will probably require their 
own rules. For example, just because the ownership of uncertificated 
securities and perhaps other property could be recorded on a blockchain, 
this should not bring them under the definition of cryptocurrency, rather 
than investment securities. 
If Article 9 were to be amended, this would be an excellent 
opportunity to also clarify that the term “money” in Sec. 1-201(a)(24) as 
intended only to cover tangible money (i.e. notes and coins), and to add a 
new category of cryptocurrency. Moreover, this new category of money 
should be added to the definition of “cash collateral.” 
2. Super-negotiability. Drafting the super-negotiation rule itself 
would be the easiest part of the task. A subsection (c) could be added to 
Sec. 9-332 that might read: 
(c) [Transferee of cryptocurrency]. A transferee of 
cryptocurrency takes the cryptocurrency free of a 
security interest unless the transferee acts in collusion 
with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured 
party. 
3. Control. In most of my discussion of bitcoin under Article 9 I have 
concentrated on the power of a transferee to take free and clear of a 
security interest. However, if it is to function like a currency, it is equally 
important that we need to provide a mechanism by which a secured party 
can obtain and protect a security interest in bitcoin by preventing the 
transfer that would create the possibility of a priority dispute in the first 
place. That is, as the drafters of the 1994 and 1999 revisions of the 
                                                                                                             
GUIDANCE: APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, 
EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013). I have deliberately chosen to use 
the term “cryptocurrency” in this article because I am not taking a position as to whether 
FinCEN’s definition, which is designed for the purpose of determining the application of 
the BSA to blockchain payments would make a good starting place for developing a 
definition for the very different purposes of formulating conveyancing rules under the 
U.C.C.  
112  ETHEREUM, https://www.ethereum.org, (last visited Jan. 17, 2016). 
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U.C.C. realized, “control” is the necessary corollary to a super-
negotiation regime. 
Looking to the control concept of Articles 8 and 9 suggests practical 
ways that a secured party of a debtor that has a direct interest in bitcoin 
could protect itself from further transfer as a practical matter. That is, 
control of intangibles (like possession of tangibles) minimizes the 
possibility that rival second-in-time property interest will ever arise. 
First, and most simply, the debtor could transfer the bitcoin to the 
secured party—just as control of securities entitlements and deposit 
accounts can be established by transferring the accounts to the secured 
party. 
Alternately, as discussed,113 the transfer of bitcoin requires the use of 
two “keys”—a “public” key that everyone in the blockchain can see to 
verify the ownership of an individual bitcoin, and a “private” key known 
only by the owner. If the private key were to be transferred to the secured 
party then the security would have the ability to transfer the bitcoin. This 
transfer of the private key could also be made an attachment or 
perfection formality under Article 9 as a technical legal matter. 
Finally, the problem with this form of “control” is that, although the 
secured party can now transfer the encumbered bitcoin, so can the 
debtor. That is, giving the private key to the secured party does not 
destroy the debtor’s knowledge of the private key. Consequently, 
perhaps a third form of control would be the creation of a new private 
key that would not be known by the debtor. 
In the meantime, a secured party who does wish to take a security 
interest in bitcoin, under the current regime, would be well-advised to 
take similar actions to protect its rights as a practical matter to prevent 
transfer, even though it would not constitute “control” for the purposes of 
attachment and perfection purposes. Although I have emphasized that 
each individual bitcoin is infinitely traceable on the blockchain, and that 
transferees are merely pseudonymous, as a practical matter, a secured 
party may have difficulty finding a transferee and garnishing an 
encumbered bitcoin as a practical matter. However, the secured party 
would still have to obtain an authenticated security agreement and file a 
financing statement for its security interest to attach and perfect so long 
as bitcoin continues to be characterized as a general intangible. 
4. Priority. Another innovation of Article 8’s indirect holding regime 
that was extended to other forms of intangibles, under Article 9, was a 
deviation of the traditional first-to-file-or-perfect priority rule with a 
hierarchical priority regime. As I shall discuss, the rule of Sec. 9-328 
with respect to investment property replaces the traditional first-to-file-
                                                                                                             
113  See supra text at note 41. 
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or-perfect priority rule with a more complex hierarchical one.114 That is, 
some forms of perfection are more powerful than others. Sec. 9-327 
contains a similar priority rule with respect to deposit accounts, namely, 
a security interest in a deposit account held by the bank at which the 
deposit account is maintained, is prior to all other secured parties unless 
the rival has obtained control by having the account transferred into its 
name under Sec. 9-104(a)(3). Secured parties who have control are prior 
to security interests perfected by some other means.115 The first-to-file-or 
perfect only applies between secured parties who perfect by the same 
means. 
An analogous rule could be added for priorities in cryptocurrencies. 
Adding “control” as an attachment and perfection formality with respect 
to cryptocurrencies does not mean that we should eliminate the option of 
perfection by filing. To do so would prevent a proceeds-security interest 
from lapsing in 21 days under 9-315(d). This rule would no longer be 
pernicious if there were a super-negotiation rule and if a security interest 
perfected by filing were subordinate to one perfected by control. It would 
probably not be necessary to add a rule for security interests taking by 
intermediaries because116 indirectly held bitcoin would more 
appropriately be characterized as financial assets under Article 8. 
B. Filing. 
One last thought before concluding. Ethereum among others, 
contemplate that the blockchain can be used for many other applications 
in addition to currency and payments. One of these is as a decentralized 
title recording system.117 Accordingly, it could be used to create one of 
the goals of secured lending—namely a single, national, searchable, 
filing system for all debtors that could replace the present state-by-state 
system. That is, financing statements could be filed on a blockchain. 
Once an appropriate protocol is developed, a state or group of states 
could begin using a blockchain filing system without amendment to 
                                                                                                             
114  See infra text at note 151-57. 
115  Because first-generation security interests in deposit accounts can only be perfected 
by control (U.C.C. § 9-312(b)(1)), as a practical matter this only applies to rival second-
generation security interests in proceeds deposited in a deposit account perfected under 
U.C.C. § 9-315(d)(2) (2010). 
116  See supra notes 114-15, in this section, for more detail. 
117  Judith Alison Lee et. al., Blockchain Technology and Legal Implications of ‘Crypto 
2.0’, BNA’S BANKING REPORT (March 31, 2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publicati
ons/Documents/Lee-Long-Blockchain-Technology-BNA-Banking-03.31.2015.pdf. 
Indeed, the country of Hondoras, is exploring using blockchain technology to replace its 
dysfunctional land registry. The Great Chain of Being Sure About Things, THE 
ECONOMIST (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21677228-technol
ogy-behind-bitcoin-lets-people-who-do-not-know-or-trust-each-other-build-dependable. 
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Article 9. Although Part 5 of Article 9 refers in several places to a filing 
office (see e.g. 9-501(a)), there is no reason under the language of the 
U.C.C. that a state’s filing office, usually the Secretary of State, could 
not establish a blockchain recording system to that recording on the 
blockchain would constitute filing with that office under Part 5.118 
Similarly, there is no reason why Sec. 9-519’s requirements for 
numbering, maintaining and indexing records and communicating 
information provided in records could not be met through an electronic 
ledger system, including one maintained by a third party contractor. If 
anything, such a system could probably be made more efficient and 
accurate than systems currently in place. 
Moreover, states need not fear that single system would eliminate the 
filing fees that they currently collect—a concern that could be an 
impediment to having states adopt the amendments. We could continue 
the practice whereby a filing fee must be paid to the state of the debtor’s 
location. A “smart” blockchain ledger could be programmed to allow 
secured parties to automatically transfer filing fees to the Secretary of 
State of the jurisdiction of the debtor’s location by transferring funds on 
the blockchain itself. 
PART 2: INDIRECT OWNERSHIP OF BITCOIN UNDER ARTICLE 8 
If bitcoin constitutes a general intangible under Article 9, then it will 
never shed a perfected proceeds security interest no matter how many 
times it is transferred. Luckily, this does not mean that an encumbered 
bitcoin could never be freed from a security interest. If an owner of 
bitcoin is willing to hold it indirectly through a third party, then she 
could take advantage of the super-negotiation rules of Article 8.119 This is 
because, if the third party qualifies as a “securities intermediary,” then 
the holder and the securities intermediary can elect to treat bitcoin held in 
an account as a “financial asset.” 
Although, this might be a work around of Article 9 for some bitcoin 
owners, it would defeat one of the primary advantages of 
                                                                                                             
118  This would likely necessitate amendments to a state’s non-U.C.C. administrative 
laws and regulations, but that is beyond the scope of this Article. 
119  George K. Fogg of the law firm of Perkins Coie has come to a similar conclusion. 
Fogg, supra note 29, at 4-5. Professor Lawless has rejected the use of Article 8 as a 
means of curing the problems of the non-negotiability on the grounds that bitcoins are not 
securities within the meaning of Article 8. Bob Lawless, Is UCC Article 8 Bitcoin’s 
Savior (for Commercial Law)?, CREDIT SLIPS (March 28, 2014), http://www.creditslips.or
g/creditslips/2014/03/is-ucc-article-8-bitcoins-savior-for-commercial-law.html. Although 
I agree with this aspect of his analysis, it does not recognize that, while not securities, 
bitcoin can, under the conditions I discuss, be treated as investment property. 
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cryptocurrencies over conventional payment systems such as checking 
accounts, credit or debit cards, automatic clearing house transactions, 
wire transfers or money transmissions. This is precisely the ability to 
engage in person-to-person transfers of value the need to use a mediating 
bank, broker or other institution. 
However, Article 8 does potentially offer a pre-existing legal regime 
that might help the development of uses of the blockchain other than of 
conveying. 
I. Article 8’s History. 
A. The Paper Crunch. 
Article 8’s indirect holding regime is as anti-intuitive as it is 
successful. To understand it, it is useful to consider its historical 
development.120 The common law had a very difficult time 
conceptualizing the conveyancing of intangibles. Consequently, when 
stock markets started developing in the 19th century, legislative action 
was necessary to enable the free alienability of common stock. These 
early statutes analogized common stock to negotiable instruments. A 
stockholder’s claim in the corporation would be evidenced by a unique 
piece of paper—the stock certificate—which could only be transferred 
by physical delivery accompanied by any necessary indorsements. 
Actually, the system was somewhat more complex than the law of 
instruments. Corporate codes also provided that a corporation need only 
recognize the claims to receive dividends and to vote their securities of 
stockholders who are registered as owners on the corporate stock transfer 
ledger. For a transferee to become the record owner of the stock, it would 
need to deliver the stock certificate and any necessary indorsements to 
the corporation which would then cancel the old certificate, issue a new 
certificate in the name of the transferee, register the transfer on its books 
and deliver the new stock certificate to the transferee.121 
Although cumbersome, this system of direct ownership seems 
intuitive because we have replaced an intangible—which is hard to think 
about—with a tangible piece of property. This makes the trading of stock 
feel like a simple sale of goods. It works perfectly well for privately held 
corporations and is therefore retained in the statute. 
It also worked reasonably well until the 1960’s when the average 
number of daily trades ballooned to 10 million, a number that seemed as 
                                                                                                             
120  For a more detailed treatment of Article 8, see Schroeder, Article 8, supra note 47, 
and Schroeder & Carlson, Security Interests, supra note 70. 
121  For a description of traditional stock registration, see Pierpoint v. Hoyt, 260 N.Y. 26 
(N.Y 1932). 
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unimaginably large then as it seems ridiculously small, today.122 This 
caused the “paper crunch.” The New York Stock Exchange had to close 
on Wednesdays so that small armies of messengers literally ran around 
Wall Street delivering stacks of transferred stock certificates.123 
B. The Failed Uncertificated Security. 
A committee was formed to amend Article 8 to solve the paper 
crunch. The drafters’ solution seems almost charmingly naive from a 21st 
century perspective.124 They thought that they could lessen the paper 
crunch by eliminating a piece of physical paper. And, voila, they 
invented the “uncertificated security” which was just that—a security 
that was not represented by a physical stock certificate, but only on the 
stock transfer books of the corporation. 
The uncertificated security had a number of flaws. First, the “paper 
work”—understood as the procedures required to convey an 
uncertificated security—was more, not less, burdensome than that for 
traditional certificated securities.125 Second, it lacked the intuitive appeal 
of certificated securities. And, third, the problem it was created to solve 
no longer existed by the time the 1979 amendments were promulgated. 
As a result, the uncertificated security regime adopted in the 1977 
revision never caught on. Even today, it is used primarily by mutual 
funds which shares, of course, do not trade.126 It is true that federal debt 
securities, such as treasury bonds, were, and still are, issued only in 
book-entry form, but the Federal Reserve Bank so distrusted Article 8’s 
regime it adopted a regulation saying that federal uncertificated securities 
would be deemed to be certificated for the purpose of Article 8!127 
As I shall discuss, in Part 3, Article 8’s failed uncertificated security 
regime, which was reformed in 1994, may be given a new life because it 
permit the issuance and trading of blockchain cryptosecurities in the 
direct ownership regime. It is ironic that the drafters who could not 
understand their own present, may have ended up predicting the future. 
                                                                                                             
122  Schroeder & Carlson, Security Interests, supra note 70, at 562 n. 13. 
123  Id. 
124  Schroeder, Article 8, supra note 46, at 312 n. 42. 
125  Gillette and Maher, Revised Article 8: Issuers Beware!, 15 U.C.C. L. J. 146, 147-48 
(1982). 
126  If one wants to invest in a mutual fund—the colloquial term for an open-ended 
investment company—one does not go into the market and buy a share from another 
investor. Rather one buys a share directly from the fund itself. Similarly, when one wants 
to divest one’s interest, one does not seek to sell shares in the market, one redeems one’s 
interest. Accordingly, the amount of assets under investment by a mutual fund grows and 
shrinks. This is to be contrasted a closed-ended investment company, sometimes called 
an exchange traded fund, in which shares are traded. 
127  Schroeder & Carlson, Security Interests, supra note 70, at 560. 
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C. Immobilization. 
To return to the 1960’s, the financial industry could not wait for a 
drafting committee to invent a law to solve the paper crush. Rather, it 
developed a practical solution: immobilization. That is, it did not get rid 
of paper, it reduced paper work. 
One benefit of this solution is that it reconciled a number of 
competing goals. Wall Street wants transfers to be frequent and fast. 
Today, the average daily trading volume on the New York Stock 
Exchange alone regularly exceeds 1 billion shares.128 In contrast, 
corporations that have to maintain stock transfer books and send out 
dividend checks and proxy statements, etc. to registered owners, want 
transfers to be infrequent and slow. Immobilization and the use of 
intermediaries meets both of these needs by creating two parallel modes 
of owning and transferring stock: the traditional slow, direct, record 
ownership regime and a new, fast, indirect, beneficial ownership one 
layered on top of it. 
Many investors have long opted to hold their shares through a 
brokerage account. Immobilization took this to the next level. The 
securities industry formed a new entity, the Depository Trust Corporation 
(now called the Depositary Trust & Clearing Corporation or DTCC) 
owned by the brokerage firms and banks that maintain securities 
accounts at DTCC and use its services. One of DTCC’s functions was 
and is to physically hold stock certificates issued by corporations. 
Trading of pro-rata interests in this stock takes place on DTCC’s 
computers. 
Let us consider a simple example as to how this works. X Corp. has 
an initial public offering of 50 million shares of common stock. As is 
typical, a substantial percentage of these shares will go into the DTCC 
system. Accordingly, X will issue one or more jumbo certificates 
representing, let’s say, 40 million shares to DTCC (actually, the name on 
the certificate and on the company’s books will be CEDE & Co., 
DTCC’s nominee). DTCC will keep this jumbo certificate in its vaults.129 
DTCC will have no beneficial interest in the shares represented by 
the jumbo certificate. Rather the jumbo represents the aggregate shares 
                                                                                                             
128 Daily NYSE Group Volume in NYSE Listed, 2016, NYX DATA, http://www.nyxdata.co
m/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_edition.asp?mode=table&key=3141&category=3 (last 
visited June 5, 2016). Moreover, a majority of trades in the U.S. no longer occur on the 
New York Stock Exchange. 
129  DTCC’s vault at 55 Water Street in downtown Manhattan was flooded by the storm 
surge caused by Superstorm Sandy in October 2012, causing substantial damage to 1.7 
million securities certificates. Superstorm Sandy Recovery, DTCC 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, 
http://www.dtcc.com/annuals/2013/superstorm-sandy-recovery/index.php (last visited 
June 5, 2016). 
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beneficially purchased by its members in the IPO. Accordingly, DTCC’s 
records might show that 10 million shares have been credited to 
Goldman Sachs’s securities account, 5 million to Citibank’s, 1 million to 
Morgan Stanley’s, etc. 
Say I want to “buy” 100 shares of X. I will call up Victor, my 
registered representative at Morgan Stanley with which I have a 
securities account. He will arrange for a book entry to be made on 
Morgan Stanley’s books crediting my account with 100 of the shares that 
are shown on its account at DTCC and debiting my account with the 
purchase price of the shares. 
Notice that my purchase of shares may or may not have resulted in 
bookkeeping entries at DTCC’s level, and certainly did not result in a 
transfer at the corporate level. It might be that Morgan Stanley was 
holding a certain number of shares of X stock in inventory, and 
transferred some of those to me. Or, it could be that another customer of 
Morgan Stanley wanted to sell 100 shares of X stock on the same day, in 
which case a debit would have been made in her account along with the 
credit to my account. DTCC would only get involved if, for example, 
Morgan Stanley needed to acquire 100 additional shares of X to satisfy 
my purchase, in which case it would have to would “purchase” 100 of 
the shares that another broker had “in its account” at DTCC. 
In fact it is more complex in practice. Brokerages and banks do not 
settle their trades in real time. Rather, they and DTCC keep a running tab 
of all trades by its members and net them after the close of markets. 
Consequently, even though Morgan Stanley and its customers might in a 
single day sell 50,000 shares of X to Goldman Sachs and its customers, 
and on the same date, Goldman Sachs and its customers may sell 60,000 
shares of X to Morgan Stanley and its customers, DTCC’s records will 
only show a debit of 10,000 X shares out of Goldman Sachs’s account 
and a credit of 10,000 X shares into Morgan Stanley’s account. Now, add 
to this example the fact that trades are not being made between only two 
brokerage houses but among hundreds or thousands of brokerages and 
banks, and the netting becomes increasingly complex. Under current 
SEC regulation known as T + 3, transactions in securities must clear (i.e. 
all the netting must be accomplished) three business days following the 
date of the transaction. The Fed performs a similar function with respect 
to federal debt securities. 
Even this abbreviated description of the indirect holding system 
should make a few things clear. Although I say colloquially that I own 
100 shares of X stock this terminology is not technically correct. Under 
the federal securities laws I am only the beneficial owner of 100 shares 
of X stock. In fact, I have no direct interest, let alone record ownership, 
in any specific share of stock. In the parlance of the U.C.C. I have 
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“securities entitlement”130 against Morgan Stanley for something, and 
Morgan Stanley has a securities entitlement against DTCC. Only DTCC 
has a claim as a stockholder of record against X under corporate law, and 
only DTCC is an owner of a security under commercial law. Moreover, 
when I buy and sell “stock,” it is not merely impracticable, it is usually 
impossible to trace my purchase or sale to a corresponding sale or 
purchase by another investor or institution. Moreover, I have no 
relationship with DTCC—for the purposes of commercial law we are 
complete strangers.131 
D. The Fall of the 1977 Revision. 
The drafters of the 1977 revision to Article 8 who were concentrating 
on their new invention of uncertificated securities were not unaware of 
this development and did draft provisions purporting to govern the 
transfer (including the creation and perfection of security interests) in 
securities held in what they infelicitously called a “fungible bulk.” The 
problem was that the drafters did not understand the implications of the 
points made in the previous paragraph. They analogized securities being 
held indirectly through brokers and DTCC to goods held by a bailee and 
conceptualized the relationship of me, at the bottom of this pyramid, as a 
principal and DTCC, as my agent even though, in fact, DTCC literally 
does not know that I exist. As described above in my discussion of 
“possession” under the U.C.C., the traditional way a secured party 
perfected a security interest by possession when goods are held by a 
bailee was by giving notice to the bailee. 
Despite its woefully inadequate treatment of indirectly held 
securities, the indirect holding system functioned on its own for over a 
decade. This is because the property law of indirect securities only 
becomes important if a broker-dealer or other intermediary becomes 
insolvent and does not have sufficient securities or other assets to satisfy 
the claims of its customers. For example, suppose that a broker-dealer 
has told its customers that it is holding an aggregate of 1 million shares 
of X Corp. on behalf of all of its customers. The broker-dealer becomes 
insolvent and its receiver discovers that, in fact, it only holds 800,000 
shares. In such a case, one would need to figure out which customers (or 
their secured parties) owned the shares, and which only now had an 
unsecured claim in the broker-dealer’s insolvency proceeding. 
                                                                                                             
130  U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(17) (1994). 
131  Nor do I have any relationship with X for commercial or corporate law purposes. 
The securities laws do, however, in some circumstances, require or permit X to recognize 
me as beneficial owner. This is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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This rarely happened because of strict regulation by the SEC, the Fed 
and the Securities Protection Insurance Company (“SIPC”) established in 
1970 under the Securities Protection Insurance Act (“SIPA”).132 To 
oversimplify, the regulators closely monitor the solvency of broker-
dealers having retail clients. In most cases when a broker approaches 
insolvency, SIPC seizes the broker and sells its customer accounts to a 
solvent broker-dealer. As a result, the customer experiences the 
transaction not as an insolvency proceeding, but as corporate 
reorganization. In the rare cases in which the accounts cannot be 
transferred and there is a shortfall, SIPC will liquidate the broker-dealer, 
distribute investment assets pro rata to customers, and insure the 
existence of missing securities up to $500,000.133 
The flaws of Article 8 were only revealed when a hole in the 
regulatory system was revealed. Broker-dealers who dealt solely with 
government securities were exempt from this regulation. When a number 
of these government securities broker-dealers failed in 1980’s, for the 
first time the courts had to apply the conveyancing and priority rules of 
Article 8. The general consensus was that the results were 
unsatisfactory.134 
II. The Current Regime. 
Because of this, and a number of other events, including the so-
called market “break” of 1987, and the bankruptcy of Drexel Burnham 
Lambert, the SEC convinced Congress to direct it to write a federal 
regulation of securities clearing unless state law were amended better to 
reflect modern practice.135 NCCUSL appointed a committee in order to 
update Articles 8 and 9.136 When the first committee proved 
insufficiently ambitious, a second committee was appointed to rethink 
the Article 8 regime entirely. 
                                                                                                             
132  Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa et seq (amended 
2010). 
133  Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78fff-3(a) (amended 2010). 
They also guarantee cash claims up to $250,000 (subject to a cost of living adjustment). 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78fff-3(d), (e). Although, brokers can file for bankruptcy under the 
Bankruptcy Act, under which SIPC would act as trustee, typically SIPC will exercise its 
power to convert the proceeding to a SIPA liquidation. Under both regimes, customers 
who held their securities indirectly in street name share pro rata in the securities that the 
broker actually holds. The difference is that, in bankruptcy, the trustee will sell the 
broker’s holdings and distribute cash to the customer’s. Under SIPA, SIPC will, to the 
extent practical, make distributions in kind. Schroeder, Article 8, supra note 47, at 461-
60. 
134  I discuss the caselaw in Schroeder, Article 8, supra note 47, at 334-49. 
135  Schroeder, Article 8, supra note 47, at 349. 
136  Id. 
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A. Securities Entitlements. 
The result was that Article 8 now has two very different sets of rules. 
The first, which only covers securities held directly, largely retains and 
clarifies the traditional rules of securities trading. I will discuss how 
these work with respect to uncertificated securities later in this Article. 
The second, governing securities held indirectly, was written from 
scratch. Essentially, the new committee, unlike its predecessor, did not 
speculate how indirect securities holding and trading might work and try 
to develop a law by analogy. Rather, it studied what DTCC, the Fed, 
broker-dealers and banks actually did, and wrote a statute describing this 
practice. 
Current Article 8 rejects the assumption of old Article 8 that 
investors owned securities held indirectly, by analogy to bailments. The 
investor holding indirectly is now not conceptualized as the security 
holder at all. She is now an “entitlement holder”137 who has a “securities 
entitlement” against a “securities intermediary”138 with maintains a 
“securities account.”139 A securities entitlement cannot easily be shoe-
horned into pre-existing legal categories; it is sui generis. It is therefore 
defined in Sec. 8-109(a)(17) as “the rights and property interests of an 
entitlement holder with respect to a financial asset specified in Part 5 of 
Article 8.140 
Without getting into the weeds of Part 5, which is beyond the scope 
of this Article, the point is to give the entitlement holder economic rights 
that are nearly equivalent to those of someone who holds a security 
directly by requiring the securities intermediary to pass along the benefits 
of all rights it has against the issuer of the security as record owner of the 
security. For example, only registered holders of common stock are 
entitled to receive dividends or vote. Under Sec. 8-505, the securities 
intermediary must, therefore, distribute dividends it receives in its 
capacity as record owner of stock pro rata to the entitlement holders of 
securities entitlements with respect to that stock. Under Sec. 8-506 it 
must vote its stock as directed by the entitlement holders. Under Sec. 8-
507, the securities intermediary must obey the instructions (called 
“entitlement orders”141) of the entitlement holder with respect to the 
financial assets held in the securities account. For example, if I tell 
Victor to sell my 100 shares of X, he must cause Morgan Stanley to make 
an entry debiting my account of 100 X shares and crediting it with the 
                                                                                                             
137  U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(7) (1994). 
138  U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(14) (1994). 
139  U.C.C. § 8-501(a) (1994). 
140  U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(17) (1994). 
141  U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(8) (1994). 
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sales price of 100 X shares (minus a commission). (Note in the last 
example, although I am an “expert” in Article 8 law and understand its 
arcane vocabulary, most people, including myself, continue to use the 
now obsolete language of direct security holding, except when I am 
writing a law review article or drafting a contract, where exactitude is 
required). 
Under Sec. 8-504, the securities intermediary must at all times own 
either securities directly, or securities entitlements indirectly, sufficient 
to cover all of the securities entitlements of all of its entitlement holders. 
To go back to my example, I have a securities entitlement against 
Morgan Stanley as a financial intermediary with respect to 100 X shares. 
Imagine that entitlement holder A and B, other Morgan Stanley 
customers, have securities entitlements with respect to 200 and 300 X 
shares, respectively. Morgan Stanley must at all times either own 
directly, or have securities entitlements with DTCC or another securities 
intermediary, with respect to 600 shares of X stock.142 
B. Conveyancing and Super-Negotiation. 
What concerns us here are the conveyancing rules of Articles 8 and 9 
with respect to “financial assets” held in securities accounts. To reiterate, 
all conveyancing regimes must balance between the two contradictory 
policies of protecting first-in-time possessory rights and encouraging 
market transactions by allowing certain favored transferees to take free 
of those rights. Traditional regimes for most types of property other than 
hand-to-hand money, have at least in form favored the former over the 
latter in the sense that the default rule is that a first-in-time claimant 
prevails unless the transferee can prove that she is entitled to a 
negotiation exception. Usually this requires that the transferee show that 
she gave value, had the requisite level of good faith, and sometimes the 
satisfaction of other market requirements such as the transaction being in 
the ordinary course of business or finance. 
The drafters decided that there was a national interest that the 
securities markets be as liquid as possible—investors who buy securities 
in the stock exchange should not have to worry about title. Consequently, 
they came close to reversing the default rule; purchasers prevail over 
first-in-time parties unless they acted with an affirmative bad faith. Five 
years later, the 1999 revisions to Article 9 went a step further in applying 
this principal to money and deposit accounts, also reversing the 
                                                                                                             
142  These rights are supplemented by the rights granted to customers against registered 
broker-dealers under federal and state securities and banking regulation, as well as rules 
of self-regulatory organizations. These are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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traditional default rule so now the first-in-time party now loses unless it 
can show that the transferee met the bad faith test.143 
The harshness, from the first-in-time claimant is mitigated in two 
ways. First, the scope of the super-negotiation rule is limited. It does not 
cover securities held directly by the investor, which remain subject to a 
slightly modified traditional rule that I will discuss later.144 Second, it 
does not apply to the entire securities entitlement, but to specific 
financial assets held in a securities account with respect to which the 
entitlement holder claims a securities entitlement. Third, the statute 
creates a new mode of perfection of security interests that will have the 
same practical effect of the physical possession of tangible collateral—
control. Indeed, control can be thought of as a corollary to super-
negotiability. 
C. Control. 
The super-negotiation rule of Article 8 is set forth in Section 8-
503(e) which provides: 
An action based on the entitlement holder’s property 
interest with respect to a particular financial asset under 
subsection (a), whether framed in conversion, replevin, 
constructive trust, equitable lien, or other theory, may 
not be asserted against any purchaser of a financial asset 
or interest therein who gives value, obtains control, and 
does not act in collusion with the securities intermediary 
in violating the securities intermediary’s obligations [to 
the entitlement holder under Part 5]. 
This is supplemented by Sec. 9-331(b), which states that Article 9 
“does not limit the rights of or impose liability on a person to the extent 
that the person is protected against the assertion of a claim under Article 
8.” Note, that Article 8’s rule is somewhat narrower than Article 9’s for 
deposit accounts in that it is limited to “purchasers for value” whereas 
Article 9 protects “transferees.” This should not make too much of a 
difference because, the U.C.C., following traditional property rules, does 
not adopt the lay definition that would limit a purchaser to a buyer, but 
instead includes anybody who takes in a voluntary transaction creating a 
property interest.1456That is, the only transferees who are not protected 
would be donees, lien creditors and thieves—commercial law’s 
disfavored step-children. 
                                                                                                             
143  See supra text at note 47. 
144  See infra text at note 182. 
145  U.C.C. § 1-204 (2001). 
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Consequently, to go back to our recurring example, Debtor grants a 
security interest in its inventory to Bank, who perfects by filing. If 
Debtor sells a computer and receives bitcoin as payment, the Bank has a 
perfected security interest in the bitcoin (the “encumbered bitcoin”) as 
proceeds. The problem is that, because bitcoin would constitute a 
“general intangible” under Article 9, this security interest will continue 
even after disposition by Debtor, i.e. if Debtor uses the encumbered 
bitcoin to pay for goods or services, the transferee will take it subject to 
Bank’s interest. This is because there is no negotiation rule for general 
intangibles that cuts off the adverse claims of perfected security interests. 
Because the blockchain makes each specific bitcoin traceable forever, 
this rule threatens the utility of bitcoin and its progeny as an alternative 
currency or payment system. 
If, however, Debtor, rather than holding the encumbered bitcoin 
directly in its own name, holds it indirectly through a securities 
intermediary, then it, and its transferees, could avail themselves of the 
super-negotiation rule of 8-504(3). It would then be an entitlement holder 
who has a securities entitlement with respect to the bitcoin as financial 
asset held in a securities account maintained by a securities intermediary. 
If it wishes to transfer the encumbered bitcoin, it would give its securities 
intermediary an entitlement order to transfer the encumbered bitcoin to 
the transferee. In the vast majority of cases, the transferee would take the 
bitcoin free and clear of the Bank’s adverse claim. 
D. Financial Assets. 
This rule, however, only applies to “financial assets” held by a 
securities intermediary. Consequently, the first stage in our analysis is to 
determine whether or not a bitcoin is a financial asset. The good news is 
that, although it is not necessarily a financial asset, it can be made into 
one. Perhaps more exciting is that this analysis suggests that any asset 
recorded on a blockchain could be made into a financial asset entitled to 
Article 8’s super-negotiability regime! 
1. Categorization. Let me make a few points about the 
characterization of assets for Article 8 purposes. The question as to 
whether an asset is or is not a security for the purposes of commercial 
law is completely distinct from the question as to whether it is a security 
for the purposes of federal or state securities laws. Articles 8 and 9 are 
primarily conveyancing regimes. They are concerned with the rights that 
rival property claimants have with respect to an asset. The securities 
laws, in contrast, are investor protection statutes. They are concerned, 
therefore, with the substantive rights the investor has vis a vis the issuer 
of the security. Consequently, although there is substantial overlap 
between the definitions of the two regimes with respect to some 
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traditional investments, some investments that are securities for one 
regime may or may not be investments for the other. For example, most 
common stock in a corporation would in the vast majority of cases be 
considered securities under both regimes.1467In contrast, limited 
partnership interests are presumed to be securities under the federal 
securities laws, but traditionally they would not have been securities for 
Article 8 purposes.1478Although not free from doubt, limited partnership 
interests would probably not have been securities under the 1977 version 
of Article 8 because they were probably not “of a type commonly dealt 
in on securities exchanges or markets.” Under revised Article 8, the 
securities status of limited partnership interests is elective. That is, the 
organizer of a limited partnership could choose whether or not to have its 
interests governed by Article 8. 
Once the drafting committee of what would eventually become the 
1994 revisions to Article 8 came up with the concept of the securities 
entitlement, then it soon became obvious that there was no reason to 
limit the definition of financial assets to traditional securities. Indeed, to 
do so would likely have had a negative effect because investors already 
held a wide variety of investments in their securities accounts.1489I 
                                                                                                             
146  Common stock of a corporation meets all three elements of the definition of security 
in Sec. 8-102(a)(15) discussed infra in text at note 175. Both Sec. 2(a)(1) of the Securities 
Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)) and Sec. 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(10)) include “stock” as the first category of investments 
constituting a security for the purposes of those acts. The Supreme Court, in United 
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman (421 U.S. 837 (1975)), held that sometimes 
investments that are designated as shares of stock will nevertheless not constitute “stock” 
for the purposes of the federal securities laws if they lack the most common features of 
stock. However, in Landreth Timber Company v. Landreth (471 U.S. 681 (1995)), the 
Court clarified that ordinarily the stock of a business corporation do have the common 
features of stock and are, therefore, presumed to be securities. 
147  Partnership interests do not fall within any of the type of investments constituting 
securities enumerated in the two securities acts. They, however, would be securities if 
they fell within the “catchall” category of “investment contracts” as determined by the 
Howey test discussed supra in note 49. Although partnership interests are investments of 
money in a common enterprise, with the expectations of profits, there is a question as to 
whether these profits will be predominantly from the efforts of others. Ordinarily it is 
assumed that, since, by law, limited partners may not manage the partnership and general 
partners have the power to manage the partnership, the former would meet the Howey test 
and constitute a security, whereas the latter would not (although courts will occasionally 
find exceptions to these general rules). JAMES D. COX ET AL , SECURITIES REGULATION; 
CASES AND MATERIALS 48-49 (6th ed. 2009). 
148  They also realized that, once Article 8 set up a clear conveyancing regime, the 
issuers of investments, that did not traditionally fall within Article 8, might want to opt 
into this new regime. For example, Sec. 8-103(c) repeats the traditional rule that interests 
in privately held limited partnerships and limited liability company interests are not 
necessarily financial assets, but these interests could be if such companies’ organizational 
documents “expressly provide that it is a security governed by [Article 8 of the UCC].” 
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suggest that the invention of the blockchain might enable investors to 
elect to submit almost any form of property to Article 8’s regime. 
2. Definition. Consequently, 8-102(a)(9) includes three categories of 
investments in the definition of financial assets. I will analyze the first 
two categories in Part 3 when I discuss cryptosecurities. It is the third 
category that interests us here. The term financial asset includes: 
(iii) any property that is held by a securities intermediary 
for another person in a securities account if the securities 
intermediary has expressly agreed with the other person 
that the property is to be treated as a financial asset 
under this Article. 
The section continues: 
As context requires, the term [i.e. financial asset] means 
either the interest itself or the means by which a person’s 
claim to it is evidenced, including a certificated or 
uncertificated security, a security certificate, or a 
security entitlement. 
This third definition of financial asset requires that it be held by a 
securities intermediary, which is defined as: 
(i) a clearing corporation; or 
(ii) a person, including a bank or broker, that in the 
ordinary course of its business maintains securities 
accounts for others and is acting in that capacity. 
Since the definition of clearing corporation is limited to federal 
reserve banks and certain entities licensed by the SEC, it does not seem 
relevant to our discussion at this time. Conventional broker-dealers and 
banks that currently act as securities intermediaries obviously fall within 
this provision and could agree to hold bitcoin as financial assets, 
although I have no knowledge that any are yet doing so at the time I am 
writing this Article. However, there are numerous bitcoin exchanges, 
wallets and service companies—such as Coinbase—that might be able 
organize themselves in such a way as to meet this definition by 
characterizing their relationships with their clients as securities accounts. 
According to Sec. 8-501: 
                                                                                                             
That is, these organizations can elect whether or not they want Article 8 to govern the 
transfer of their interests. U.C.C. § 8-103(c) (1994). 
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“Securities account” means an account to which a 
financial asset is or may be credited in accordance with 
an agreement under which the person maintaining the 
account undertakes to treat the person for whom the 
account is maintained as entitled to exercise the rights 
that comprise the financial asset. 
3. First-Generation Security Interests. Another advantage of holding 
bitcoin indirectly and characterizing it as financial asset is that it permits 
the creation of first-generation security interests (as opposed to proceeds 
security interests). To date, to my knowledge, debtors do not enter into 
security agreements granting security interests in bitcoin. However, if 
bitcoin were to become a significant payment device—or if the 
blockchain were to become a significant means of recording the 
ownership and transfer of property—then one would expect that lenders 
would wish to take it as collateral. One might also conversely argue, that 
bitcoin will not reach its potential as a commercial device unless it can 
serve as collateral. So-called “cash collateral” in which a secured party 
has a securities interest in a deposit account is used in any number of 
financial transactions. There should be a way of using bitcoin accounts 
for these purposes. This would be particularly the case of blockchain 
securities, since conventional securities are used as collateral for margin 
loans in the ordinary course. 
The problem with holding bitcoin directly is, as we saw, is that it 
currently would be considered a general intangible. We have 
concentrated so far on the disadvantages of this for the debtor and its 
transferees, namely that it can never be disencumbered from a perfected 
proceeds security interest without the approval of the secured party. 
But the status as a general intangible is also problematic for the 
secured party. Although the secured party retains a security interest in a 
transferred general intangible, it has no practical means of preventing the 
transfer in the first place. Although the blockchain is completely 
traceable, as a practical matter it may be difficult to find the owner of a 
transferred bitcoin. Even if the secured party does locate the owner, it 
may not be clear how it could garnish bitcoin under present debtor-
creditor procedure. 
Sec. 9-314(1) states that “[a] security interest in investment 
property . . . may be perfected by control of the collateral under 
Section . . . 9-106.” The definition of “investment property” includes a 
“security entitlement [and] securities account.”14950Sec. 9-106(a) in turn 
                                                                                                             
149  U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(49) (2010). 
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provides that “[a] person has control of a . . . security entitlement as 
provided in Section 8-106.” 
4. Example: Bitcoin as Financial Asset. Before we consider the 
definition of control, let us review how this works through an example. 
We start out with Debtor being the direct owner of bitcoin worth $1 
million. It wants to grant a security interest in the bitcoin to Secured 
Party. It opens up a securities account with Securities Intermediary and 
transfers the bitcoin to Securities Intermediary. Debtor and Securities 
Intermediary agree that the bitcoin shall constitute a financial asset for 
the purpose of Article 8. Note, because Debtor is no longer the direct 
owner of the bitcoin, it now technically holds a securities entitlement 
with respect to the financial asset (i.e. the bitcoin) held in the securities 
account, as defined in Article 8, Part 5.1501 
Under Sec. 8-503, Debtor, as entitlement holder, does have some 
indirect property rights with respect to the underlying financial asset, but 
they are sui generis and beyond the scope of this discussion. What we 
care about is that one of Securities Intermediary’s duties to Debtor as 
entitlement holder is to comply with all entitlement orders with respect to 
the transfers of a financial asset. Finally, as already discussed, if a 
financial asset is transferred out of a securities account, as an empirical 
matter, the purchaser will in the overwhelming majority of cases take it 
free of adverse claims.1512 
5. Establishing Control. Consequently, although Article 9 does 
permit a secured party to perfect a security interest in a securities 
entitlement by filing, and in some circumstances security interest may be 
automatically perfected upon attachment, obviously, these modes of 
perfection give very little practical protection against subsequent 
purchasers of financial assets because the debtor can give an entitlement 
order to the securities intermediary to transfer the financial asset out of 
the account free and clear of any adverse claims including perfected 
security interests. They also give little protection against second-in-time 
secured parties under the priority rules of Sec. 9-328, which subordinate 
                                                                                                             
150  This is why Article 9 refers to security interests in securities entitlements and 
securities accounts, rather than to the underlying financial assets held in the securities 
account. U.C.C. §§ 9-101 et seq. (2010). 
151  Article 8 anticipates the transfer of securities entitlements, and Sec. 8-502 provides 
“a person who acquires a security entitlement . . . for value and without notice of [an] 
adverse claim” takes free of that claim. U.C.C. § 8-502 (1994). As an empirical matter it 
can be expected that such transfers will be limited to security interests as entitlement 
holders will rarely transfer ownership of a securities entitlement or securities account. A 
person who wants to sell a financial asset from the entitlement holder will, instead, 
require that the entitlement holder give an entitlement order to the securities intermediary 
instructing it to transfer that financial asset either directly to the buyer or to the buyer’s 
securities intermediary. 
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security interests perfected by filing to security interests perfected by 
control. Consequently, automatic perfection and perfection by filing 
should probably be thought of as being primarily for the purpose of 
protecting the secured party’s claim against second-in-time lien creditors 
and, therefore, in the debtor’s bankruptcy. 
Whereas perfection by filing gives secured parties little practical 
ability to protect themselves against transfers of collateral, the super-
negotiation regimes of Articles 8 and 9 give secured parties the ability to 
ratchet up protection through “control.” When inventing the new concept 
of control, the drafters of the 1994 revisions rejected the old paradigm 
that analogized indirect holding to possession of goods through bailees. 
Rather they asked, first, what the practical effects of physical custody of 
tangible things might be that justified the privileged status granted by the 
U.C.C., and, second, whether they could devise a schema that would 
have a similar practical effect with respect to indirectly held securities. 
The Article 8 regime they created was so successful that a similar one 
has been added to Article 9 for deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper 
and letter of credit rights. 
Physical custody by the secured party, of course, better enables the 
secured party to enforce its basic remedy upon default of selling the 
collateral. That is, one does not need to repossess what one already 
physically possesses. But, more importantly, it greatly decreases the 
ability of the debtor to transfer the collateral to a third party.1523 
Consequently, the idea of “control” is to try to minimize the chance that 
priority disputes ever arise in the first place so that the super-negotiation 
rules do not come into play. 
Sec. 8-106 provides that: 
(d) a purchaser [a term that includes secured parties] has 
“control” of a security entitlement if: 
(1) the purchaser becomes the entitlement holder; 
(2) the securities intermediary has agreed that it will 
comply with entitlement orders originated by the 
purchaser without further consent by the entitlement 
holder; or 
(3) another person has control of the security 
entitlement on behalf of the purchaser or, having 
previously acquired control of the security 
                                                                                                             
152  This is why so many commentators criticized the Tanbro case that found that a 
transferee could become a buyer in the ordinary course of business despite the fact that 
the goods were in the physical possession of the secured party. See supra text at notes 76. 
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entitlement, acknowledges that it has control on 
behalf of the purchaser. 
(e) If an interest in a security entitlement is granted by 
the entitlement holder to the entitlement holder’s own 
securities intermediary, the securities intermediary has 
control. 
Let’s look at these seriatim, starting from the first (i.e. Sec. 8-
106(d)(1)) and the last (i.e. Sec. 8-106(e)), which are the forms of legal 
control that offer the most empirical control. 
The first mode of control is the most secure. The entitlement holder 
transfers its account into the name of the purchaser—in this case the 
debtor tells the securities intermediary to change the name on its account 
to the secured party. Obviously, as the securities intermediary may only 
transfer financial assets out of a securities account upon receiving an 
entitlement order from the entitlement holder, the secured party, being 
the entitlement holder, does not bear the risk that the debtor will transfer 
away its collateral. 
Under the last mode of control the securities intermediary is also the 
party making the secured loan to the Debtor. The advantage of this mode 
of control is that Sec. 9-328(3) provides that (unless the securities 
intermediary otherwise agrees) a security interest in a securities 
entitlement held by a securities intermediary has priority over security 
interests held by any other secured party.1534 
The two intermediate modes of control involve and depend on the 
cooperation of a third party, who is neither the debtor nor the secured 
party. As such, the practical utility of these modes of control depends on 
careful contract drafting. For example, under Sec. 8-106(d)(2), a secured 
party would have control if the securities intermediary agrees to obey the 
secured party’s entitlement orders. However, note, that the debtor may 
still also have the right to give entitlement orders to the securities 
intermediary. Consequently, as a practical matter the parties need a three-
party agreement under which the parties agree under what circumstances 
the debtor and secured party may give orders and what the securities 
intermediary should do if it receives conflicting orders. For example, in 
                                                                                                             
153  Consequently, if a broker, bank or other institution that maintains security accounts 
wishes to make a loan secured by financial assets, it should consider demanding that the 
debtor open a securities account with the lender. Of course, the securities intermediary 
still does not have perfect protection because it has to obey the entitlement orders of the 
debtor as entitlement holder prior to default under the secured transaction. This means 
that the lender-securities intermediary should specify in its security agreement and 
contract establishing the securities account precisely under what circumstances the 
debtor-entitlement holder has the right to give entitlement orders. 
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order for debtor to be able to manage its portfolio, it might be contracted 
between the debtor and the secured party that, although both the debtor 
and secured party have the power to give entitlement orders, the secured 
party may not give an entitlement order until the occurrence of an event 
of default under the secured transactions. Moreover, the securities 
intermediary would agree (with the express written agreement of the 
debtor-entitlement holder) that it will not obey entitlement orders given 
by the entitlement holder after receiving of a notice from the secured 
party that an event of default has occurred under the secured 
transaction.1545 
Similar contractual issues arise under Sec. 8-106(d)(3) where a third 
party having control need only acknowledge that it has control on behalf 
of the purchaser. 
Once a hierarchy of perfection means was established, it became 
clear that there was no reason to retain the traditional rule that security 
interests in securities (and in subsequent Amendments to Article 9, 
instruments) should not be perfectible by filing like most other forms of 
collateral. One result of this is that, given that a second-in-time secured 
party could trump a first-in-time secured party by taking control, 
perfection by filing in effect only protects a filing secured party from 
subsequent lien creditors of the debtor and ensures that it survives the 
strong-arm power should the debtor become bankrupt.1556 
The adoption of a weak perfection-by-filing regime led to another 
initially surprising innovation—automatic perfection of “a security 
interest in investment property created by a broker or other securities 
intermediary.”1567Although this might at first blush seem to violate the 
notoriety function of perfection formalities, at further consideration it is 
clear that it just reflects both finance practice and common knowledge in 
the securities industry. For example, when securities intermediaries sell 
investments (either on their own account or for the account of an 
entitlement holder), the seller regularly retains a security interest in the 
sold property pending the settlement of payment, which, under current 
SEC rules, can take place up to three trading days later. Consequently, if 
we were to require perfection by filing, in effect, every securities 
intermediary in the country would have to file a financing statement 
against every other securities intermediary listing the collateral as 
“investment property.” The filing fees this would have generated would 
have no doubt been a windfall to state budgets. Given common 
                                                                                                             
154  As a practical matter, a well-written three-party control agreement should contain 
some dispute-resolutions mechanism in the event that the debtor-entitlement holder 
disputes the secured party’s claim that an event of default has occurred. 
155  11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (2005). 
156  U.C.C. § 9-309(10) (2010). 
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knowledge of the practice, such a filing requirement would be 
unnecessary as it would have served no conceivable informational 
function and be wasteful.1598 
E. Other Property as Financial Assets. 
We are now in a position to see how the blockchain protocol opens 
up the possibility of electing to submit virtually any form of property to 
Article 8. Although the popular press has been captivated by Nakamoto’s 
vision of bitcoin as an alternative currency, the possible uses of the 
blockchain are not so limited. As mentioned,16059some see the blockchain 
as a potential payment system for the transfer of any form of value, 
whether designated in conventional fiat currencies or alternative 
cryptocurrencies. Others contemplate whether it can be used to create 
self-executing “smart” contracts. 
Because the blockchain is a decentralized ledger, it could be used to 
record any form of property or other legal claims (although in practice, 
some existing legal rules, such as real estate recoding acts, might limit 
the legal efficacy of blockchain registration).1610Once a blockchain ledger 
were established, the owner of a registered claim could transfer her 
registered claim into a securities account she maintains with a securities 
intermediary. The owner, now an entitlement holder with respect to such 
claim, and the securities intermediary could now elect to have the claim 
treated as a financial asset for the purposes of Articles 8 and 9. 
                                                                                                             
159  Sales of payment intangibles (U.C.C. § 9-309(3)) and promissory notes (U.C.C. § 9-
309(4)) are automatically perfected upon attachment for similar reasons. 
 This is why, as noted in Official Comment 6 to Sec. 9-309, we have traditionally 
granted 21-day automatic perfection for certain security interests granted by what we now 
call securities intermediaries. The current regime merely eliminated the necessity for 
secured parties who wished to have an indefinite security interest to roll the loans over 
every 21 days. Moreover, as an automatically perfected security interest is subordinate to 
a later-in-time security interest perfected by control, it should be thought of, once again, 
as a protection against lien creditors and bankruptcy. 
160  See supra text at notes 12-21. 
161  It has been reported that at least one couple has recorded their marriage on a 
blockchain. William Suberg, First Blockchain marriage will take place at Disney World 
Bitcoin Conference, THE COINTELEGRAPH (Sept. 23, 2014), http://cointelegraph.com/new
s/first-blockchain-marriage-will-take-place-at-disney-world-bitcoin-conference. It is hard 
to see what the point of this gimmick might be other than publicity. The blockchain 
registration is unlikely to meet the requirements of Florida marriage law, and would seem 
to serve no other purpose since marital rights cannot be conveyed. But see c.f. THOMAS 
HARDY, THE MAYOR OF CASTERBRIDGE: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF A MAN OF CHARACTER 
(1886) (A husband auctions off his wife in a drunken pique. She lives with her 
purchaser—who luckily is a kind man and a good mate—for over 18 years in the mis-
impression that he has acquired her husband’s legal status). 
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If they were to do so, the entitlement holder and her transferees 
would be entitled to a fully developed law of conveyancing to govern 
their financial transaction without the worries of the vagaries of the 
common law. 
PART 3: CRYPTOSECURITIES AND ARTICLE 8. 
I. Introduction. 
The blockchain was invented for the purpose of allowing for the 
transfer and preventing the double-spending of cryptocurrencies. 
However, there is no reason why it needs to be limited. 
In May 2015, NASDAQ announced that it was launching a pilot 
program for using the blockchain technology to trade securities.1621Also, 
as introduced, Overstock.com has been experimenting with the issuance 
of debt securities on a blockchain1632and several large banks and the 
DTCC have completed a text run replicating trading of CDS’s over a 
distributive ledger.1643 
Byrnes believes that moving equity securities to a blockchain would 
have at least two advantages. First, it could greatly reduce the time for 
settlement of securities transactions from the current T + 3 to almost 
immediately—or at least to within an hour. Second, because of the 
transparency of the blockchain, it would eliminate naked short-selling, a 
practice that Byrne’s believes used for malicious price manipulation.1654 
The reason why the blockchain is supposed to prevent naked short-
selling is because, according to “Robby Dermody, of Counterparty [w]ith 
the blockchain, ownership of stock is reduced to pure mathematics . . . .’ 
It would be impossible to naked short a stock,’” although he 
acknowledges the possibility of bugs in the software.1665This strikes me 
as wishful thinking. If a party wished to engage in short selling in 
violation of SEC regulations, it would certainly also be ready, willing 
and able, to hide her identity through the use of third parties or 
otherwise. 
Byrne’s claims that the adoption of cryptosecurities could greatly 
decrease the timing of settlements are more realistic, if somewhat 
exaggerated. T + 3 trading is merely the maximum clearing time that 
                                                                                                             
162  NASDAQ Launches Enterprise-Wide Blockchain Technology Initiative, NASDAQ 
(May 11, 2015), http://ir.nasdaq.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=912196. 
163  See supra text at note17. 
164  See supra text at note 129-131. 
165  See supra text at note 18. 
166  Metz, supra note 18. 
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SEC regulations allow, rather than a necessary technological limit.1676 
Although U.S. equities do tend to settle three days after the transaction 
date, debt instruments can settle quicker and U.S. Treasury securities can 
settle on the transaction date. The European Union has recently imposed 
a T + 2 rule1687and DTCC has recommended that U.S. markets follow 
suit, and then consider whether it should reduce settlements further to T 
+ 1.1698Consequently, settlement through the traditional system could be 
made faster than it is now, although probably not as fast as a transfer on a 
blockchain. 
More importantly, “settlement” does not merely include transfer of a 
security from the seller to the buyer. It also includes the transfer of the 
purchase price from the buyer to the seller. Consequently, even if the 
cryptosecurity itself were to be transferred on the blockchain, settlement 
could not be completed immediately unless payment was also made over 
the blockchain. It seems doubtful to me that most investors would be 
interested in buying and selling equity securities using such a volatile 
asset as the original bitcoin. However, they may not have to as 
technology progresses. For example, Ripple Labs claims that its 
blockchain protocol can be used to settle transfers of value using 
conventional currencies in addition to XRP, its proprietary 
cryptocurrency.17069 
For my mundane purposes, however, these developments are 
interesting from a commercial law perspective because they may finally 
breathe life in to the uncertificated securities provisions added to Article 
8 in the 1977 revision, and subsequently modified in the 1994 revision. 
II. Uncertificated Securities. 
A. Back to the Future. 
Blockchain securities trading, like blockchain payments, has the 
possibility of being a truly post-modern phenomenon. As Slavoj Žižek 
asserts, post-modernism precedes, rather than succeeds, modernism.1710 
By this he means that post-modern institutions recover certain aspects of 
                                                                                                             
167  27 C.F.R. § 240.15c6-1 (1995). 
168  Central Securities Depositories (CSDs), EUROPEAN COMMISSION (May 21, 2016), 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/financial-markets/central_securities_depositories/index
_en.htm. 
169 DTCC Recommends Shortening the U.S. Trade Settlement Cycle, DTCC WHITE 
PAPER (April 2014), http://www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/WhitePapers/T2-
Shortened-Cycle-WP.pdf. 
170 Ripple Introduction, RIPPLE WIKI (Oct. 25, 2015, 10:10PM) https://wiki.ripple.com/
Ripple_Introduction. 
171  SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, LOOKING AWRY: AN INTRODUCTION TO JACQUES LACAN THROUGH 
POPULAR CULTURE 145 (1992). 
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pre-modern ones that had seemingly been superseded by modernism. 
Perhaps more accurately, from a Hegelian perspective one might say that 
post-modernism is a sublation of modernism and pre-modernism.1721It 
both preserves and negates elements of both, to create a new, if uneasy, 
resolution of their tensions. 
What pre-modern payments and securities trading had in common is 
that they could be two-party face-to-face transactions. A buyer can 
deliver hand-to-hand money to the seller in exchange for goods and 
services. Similarly, in pre-modern securities trading, a seller of securities 
could hand a physical certificate to the buyer in exchange for money. As 
a result, both sides of the transaction could occur simultaneously—a sale 
was an event.1732 
As early as the 1930’s, Karl Llewellyn argued that the problem with 
the common law of sales was that it treated pre-modern practices—which 
he called “farmers transactions”—as the norm.1743 In fact, they had been 
largely superseded in the sense that the modern norm had become what 
he called a “merchants transaction.”1754Rather than being an event, a 
merchants transaction was now a process that took place over time and 
often involved third party intermediaries such as carriers, and banks.1765 
Famously, his analysis eventually won out, leading to the promulgation 
of Article 2 on sales and the rest of the U.C.C. 
One thing that modern payment systems and securities trading have 
in common is the necessity of third-party intermediaries—banks, credit 
card companies, Western Union, PayPal, etc. in the case of payments, 
and securities intermediaries in the case of securities. Although pre-
modern direct systems still exist, they are limited to a relatively small 
class of activities as a practical matter—such as making small purchases 
at the grocery store, or holding shares in closely-held corporations which 
are rarely transferred. Although in recent years, there has been a number 
of developments that have been marketed as new peer-to-peer payment 
systems—such as Venmo—in fact, to date none of these are truly peer-
to-peer, but are merely been alternate ways of accessing the pre-existing 
credit/debit card, checking account or other intermediary systems. That 
is, Venmo and its ilk are not really P2P at all. They add an additional 
level of intermediation to the system. 
                                                                                                             
172  JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS: THE EROTICS OF THE 
MARKET 298 (2004). 
173  Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration, supra note 57, at 1306-09. 
174  Llewellyn, Horseback, supra note 57, at 727, LLEWELLYN, SALES, supra note 57, at 
53; and Llewellyn, First Struggle, supra note 57, at 879. 
175  Llewellyn, First Struggle, supra note 57, at 876. 
176  Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration, supra note 57, at 1309-11. 
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What the blockchain offers is the possibility of reinstating a pre-
modern, direct, unmediated way of transferring value or securities, but 
using modern electronic communications. Will people use these new 
systems? Only time will tell. I use the credit card system for most 
payments in order to get “miles” and other perks, and in order to obtain 
the “charge-back” protection. I will probably continue to hold my 
securities indirectly through my broker for convenience and the services 
it renders. However, it is likely that intermediaries will begin to use new 
technologies in order to speed up transactions. Moreover, the willingness 
of customer and merchants to continue to use intermediaries might 
change if the difference in speed and cost are great enough. 
B. Characterization Under Article 8. 
Bitcoin stock would be also be post-modern because it could revive 
the failed experiment of uncertificated securities. Consequently, trading 
securities over a blockchain, would not require amendments to Article 8. 
Sec. 8-102(a)(18) simply defines an uncertificated security as “a 
security that is not represented by a certificate.” Section 8-102(a)(15) 
reads: 
“Security,” . . . means an obligation of an issuer or a 
share, participation, or other interest in an issuer, or a 
share, participation, or other interest in an issue or in 
property or an enterprise of an issuer: 
(i) which is represented by a security in bearer or 
registered form, or the transfer of which may be 
registered upon books maintained for that purpose 
by or on behalf of the issuer; 
(ii) which is one of a class or series or by its terms is 
divisible into a class or series of shares, 
participations, interests, or obligations; and 
(iii) which: 
(A) is, or is of a type, dealt in or traded on 
securities exchanges or securities markets: or 
(B) is a medium for investment and by its terms 
expressly provides that it is a security governed 
by this Article. 
Probably the most classic type of security is common stock—the 
residual equity interest in a corporation. Common stock issued on a 
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blockchain would, therefore, be an uncertificated security, with the 
blockchain constituting the “books” maintained for registering the 
transfer of the stock on behalf of the issuing corporations. As discussed, 
a blockchain is nothing but a registration of a chain of ownership. 
Despite the reference to “books,” there is no reason to think that it is 
intended to refer to physical, as opposed to electronic record keeping. 
Note there is no requirement that the company itself maintain these 
“books,” merely that they be maintained “on behalf of” the issuer—small 
publicly-traded corporations often use the services of independent stock 
transfer agents to do so. Consequently, there is no reason why the miners 
or other parties who maintain the blockchain cannot be conceptualized as 
performing this function.1776 
C. Authorization Under Corporate Law. 
Article 8 merely presents the conveyancing rules for uncertificated 
securities that have been issued. It does not give corporations or other 
issuers the authority to do so. For this, one must look to see whether the 
corporate codes of the various states do so. Fortunately, in anticipation of 
the uncertificated securities revolution that never occurred, they do. For 
                                                                                                             
177  The one and only case that has considered the meaning of Sec. 8-102(a)(15) has 
taken a very expansive reading. The 2d. Circuit certified the question to the New York 
Court of Appeals as to whether a series of promissory notes were securities governed by 
Article 8 despite the fact that they were neither in bearer or registered form nor did the 
issuer maintain note transfer books. The New York Court of Appeals agreed with the 
Second Circuit that, in interpreting the phrase “the transfer of [the obligation] may be 
registered upon books maintained for that purpose by or on behalf of the issuer [and] that 
the proper inquiry is whether the notes could have been registered on transfer books 
maintained by [the issuer] not whether they were registered on transfer books at the time 
of the litigation.” Highland Capital Mgmt., LP v. Schneider, 460 F.3d 308, 313-14 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original). 
 This is a classic example of hard facts making bad law. The Second Circuit and the 
New York Court Appeals wanted to enforce an oral contract despite the generally 
applicable statute of frauds contained in the pre-2001 version Sec. 1-206(a), which was in 
effect at that time Sec. 8-113 clarified that there is no statute of frauds for contracts for 
the sale or purchase of securities. In their zeal to achieve what they felt was the just result 
they ignored the fact that Article 8 is largely a conveyancing regime that issuers are able 
to opt in or out of. Under the Courts reasoning, Sec. 8-102(a)(15)(i) would become 
superfluous because there is always a theoretical possibility that an issuer could have 
established transfer books even if had decided not to do so. 
 One might be concerned by the “of a type” requirement of subsection (iii)(A), on the 
grounds that, although common stock generally is certainly of a type traded on securities 
exchanges and markets, blockchain stock specifically is not yet so traded. Although I 
believe that this definition is not intended to limit the form that an issuer’s securities 
trading registry takes, the ultra-cautious attorney can make use of the “opt-in” provision 
of subsection (iii)(B). That is, issuer’s board of directors can expressly specify in their 
resolutions authorizing the issuance of the stock that its stock constitutes uncertificated 
securities for the purposes of Article 8. 
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example, Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) Sec. 158 
provides that: 
The shares of a corporation shall be represented by 
certificates provided that the board of directors of the 
corporation may provide by resolution or resolutions that 
some or all of any or all classes or series of its stock 
shall be uncertificated shares. 
Consequently, Overstock, which is a Delaware corporation, could 
start issuing uncertificated common stock by board resolution, without 
amending its charter. 
The Model Business Corporation Act (“MBCA”) Sec. 6.26 permits 
the board of directors to authorize uncertificated securities “unless the 
articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise.”1787Because 
issuing uncertificated securities have to date been so unusual for 
companies other than mutual funds, I would expect that the charter and 
by-laws of most MBCA corporations are probably silent on the issue but, 
obviously, counsel would have to double-check before advising a 
corporate client. 
DGCL Sec. 159 expressly provides that transfer of stock of Delaware 
corporations is governed by Article 8, to which we now turn. One thing 
one should keep in mind as I keep emphasizing, bitcoin (or anything else 
recorded on a blockchain) is not truly anonymous, it is pseudonymous. 
The blockchain is a ledger of title, so each owner in the chain must be 
identified, at least by number, albeit, as is currently the case with 
conventionally evidenced securities, an owner could attempt to hide 
behind an alias or hold its securities indirectly through an intermediary). 
Identification of ownership is perhaps even more important for 
blockchain stock because the rights to receive notices, to vote, to receive 
dividends, exercise appraisal rights, etc. are limited to registered owners, 
so there must be someway of identifying security owners. This is 
bolstered by Sec. 8-207(a) which states that: 
Before due presentment . . . of an instruction requesting 
registration of transfer of an uncertificated security, the 
issuer . . . may treat the registered owner as the person 
exclusively entitled to vote, receive notifications, and 
otherwise exercise all the rights and powers of an owner. 
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Moreover, under the federal securities laws, proxy statements must 
be sent to registered owners, and under both the securities laws and Part 
5 of Article 8, intermediaries that are record owners acting for others, 
must pass these rights down to the persons who are beneficial owners 
under securities laws and entitlement holders under Article 8.1798This 
ability to identify the holder of the uncertificated security seems to be the 
allure of blockchain securities for Byrne of Overstock, who wants to 
thwart anonymous naked short sellers. This ignores, of course, the fact 
that uncertificated securities can be held indirectly through securities 
intermediaries just like certificated securities.18079 
D. Transfer and Delivery. 
Under Secs. 8-104(a) and 8-301, an uncertificated security is 
transferred by “delivery” under Sec. 301(b): 
Delivery of an uncertificated security to a purchaser 
occurs when: 
(1) the issuer registers the purchase as the registered 
owner, upon original issue or registration of transfer; 
or 
(2) another person, other than a securities 
intermediary, either becomes the registered owner of 
the uncertificated security on behalf of the 
purchaser, or, having previously become the 
registered owner, acknowledges that it holds for the 
purchaser. 
Note here, that unlike the U.C.C.’s use of the term “possession,” its 
definition of “delivery” is not implicitly limited to a transfer of physical 
custody, but is a term of art for the act(s) that is necessary to complete 
the transfer of the security. Delivery includes physical custody only when 
the security to be delivered is certificated. 
Although not a model of clear exposition, the way an owner of an 
uncertificated security effectuates a transfer is by giving an “instruction” 
to the issuer (or to whomever maintains the issuer’s books for the 
purpose of transfer). Sec. 8-102(1)(12) defines an instruction as: 
                                                                                                             
179  See supra text at note 141. 
180  The relationship of securities intermediaries and their clients are also governed by 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated under it, as well as by 
rules of self-regulatory organizations including FINRA and the various stock exchanges. 
The treatment of cryptosecurities under these provisions is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
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A notification communicated to the issuer of an 
uncertificated security which directs that the transfer of 
the security be registered or that the security be 
redeemed. 
An instruction must be given by an “appropriate person” defined in 
Sec. 8-107(a)(2) as “with respect to an instruction, the registered owner 
of an uncertificated security.” Sec. 8-107(b) further clarifies that an 
instruction is effective only if made “by the appropriate person” or 
agent.1810With respect to a cryptosecurity, presumably the holder would 
be able to give the instruction through the blockchain using her double-
key procedure. 
The issuer’s duty to register transfers of uncertificated securities is 
parallel to the familiar rules with respect to certificated ones. Sec. 8-401 
states in relevant part: 
(a) If . . . an instruction is presented to an issuer with a 
request to transfer of an uncertificated security, the 
issuer shall register the transfer as requested if: 
(1) under the terms of the security the person 
seeking registration of transfer is eligible to have the 
security registered in it name; 
(2) the . . . instruction is made by the appropriate 
person or by an agent who has actual authority to act 
on behalf of the appropriate person; 
(3) reasonable insurance is given that the . . . 
instruction is genuine and authorized . . . . 
(6) a demand that the register not register transfer 
has not become effective . . . ; 
(7) the transfer is in fact rightful or is to a protected 
purchaser. 
(b) If an issuer is under a duty to register a transfer of a 
security, the issuer is liable to a person presenting an 
instruction for registration or to the person’s principal 
for loss resulting from unreasonable delay in registration 
or failure or refusal to register the transfer. 
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One might ask whether the reference in Sec. 8-401 to the issuer 
registering a transfer proscribe the use of a blockchain for this purpose. I 
don’t think so. Article 8 and corporate codes merely require an issuer to 
keep a transfer ledger, but neither prescribes the method for doing so. 
Smaller issuers have long used agents to maintain their ledgers. I can see 
no reason why an issuer cannot adopt a blockchain as its ledger. Indeed, 
one can make a strong argument that its double-key transfer system, 
coupled with a miner or consensus verification process would be a safer 
mode of determining whether an instruction is genuine and authorized 
than the traditional certificated security regime that relies on examination 
of indorsements. 
E. Stop Transfer Orders. 
One potential complication of using blockchain technology is the 
right of an owner of a security under Sec. 8-403 to demand that the issuer 
not transfer it. Pursuant to 8-403(b), if the issuer receives an instruction 
to transfer an uncertificated security after receiving such a demand, the 
issuer must communicate to both the person who made the demand and 
the person who initiated the transfer request and withhold registration for 
a period not exceeding 30 days. Sec. 8-403(d) provides that the issuer 
will then be immune from liability to the person making the demand 
unless, within that period, the demanding party either brings an 
appropriate legal procedure enjoining the transfer or posts an indemnity 
bond protecting the issuer. 
Would this provision hinder one of the primary advantages of a 
blockchain recording system—that is, automatic and almost 
instantaneous settlement? 
First, I would note, as described in Official Comment 2, the impetus 
of this section was to protect “registered owners of certificated securities 
who lose or misplace their certificates.” Ordinarily, if the owner of 
directly owned certificated securities intended to transfer them, it would 
need to obtain a substitute certificate from the issuer under Sec. 8-405. 
This can be a time-consuming and expensive process because the owner 
would have to bring legal process or post a bond to protect the issuer in 
case a protected purchaser subsequently presents the “lost” certificate for 
transfer. Official Comment 2 suggests that the procedures of Sec. 8-403 
give the true owner 30 days to complete this process. It would seem that 
the drafters of Sec. 8-403 merely extended this provision to 
uncertificated securities out of mindless parallelism without much 
thought as to what it would mean to “lose” a conventional uncertificated 
security. 
However, as the Mt. Gox fiasco has shown, an intermediary 
“holding” cryptocurrencies can be hacked and bitcoins “stolen” out of an 
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account.1821Consequently, owners of cryptosecurities may, indeed, want 
a way to at least temporarily stop the transfer of “stolen” securities. 
Indeed, it should be easier, not more difficult, to deal with stop-
transfer under the blockchain than with a conventional registry. This is 
because the blockchain verification system that prevents spending the 
same “coin” twice, could also be used to prevent transfers of a specific 
cryptosecurity. It would seem to be “only” a matter of programming to 
create a system—a smart contract—in which a registered owner could, 
through the use of her public and private key, automatically put a 30 day 
block on trading of her “lost” securities.1832Moreover, a blockchain could 
also be programmed to automatically send out the notices required by 
Sec. 8-403 when it receives an attempt to transfer during this period. 
Unfortunately, any stop transfer rule would probably give little 
protection for the poor owner of a stolen cryptosecurity as an empirical 
matter. Sec. 8-403(a) provides: 
A person who is an appropriate person to . . . originate 
an instruction may demand that the issuer not register 
transfer of a security by communicating to the issuer a 
notification that identifies the registered owner and the 
issue of which he security is a part and provides an 
address for communications directed to the person 
making the demand. The demand is effective only if it is 
received by the issuer at a time and in a manner 
affording the issuer reasonable opportunity to act on it. 
(Emphasis added.) 
                                                                                                             
182  See supra note 5. After we served on a panel about bitcoin together at my law 
school, I had coffee with the now notorious Charlie Shrem (see supra note 40). To show 
me how bitcoin worked, he opened up a digital wallet on my iPad with Instawallet, a rival 
bitcoin exchange, and transferred 5 satoshis (i.e. bitcoin cents) to me. This was worth 
somewhere between $4 and $5 at that time—about the amount he owed me for his latte. I 
forgot about this until the price of a single bitcoin was trading over $1,000, raising 
Shrem’s coffee reimbursement to more than $50. I was not able to open my eWallet. It 
turned out that less than a month after opening my eWallet, Instawallet became one of the 
first bitcoin exchanges to be looted by thieves and closed down. Joe Weisenthal, 
BITCOIN SERVICE INSTAWALLET: We’ve Been Hacked And Are Suspending Service 
Indefinitely, BUSINESS INSIDER, (April 3, 2013, 2:36PM), http://www.businessinsider.com
/instawallet-suspended-2013-4. 
183  Sec. 8-407 provides that: 
A person acting as authenticating trustee, transfer agent, registrar, or 
other agent for an issuer in the registration of a transfer of its 
securities, in the issuer of new . . . uncertificated securities . . . has the 
same obligation to the . . . Owner of a . . . uncertificated security with 
regard to the particular functions performed as the issuer has in 
regard to those functions. 
U.C.C. § 8-407 (1994). 
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Presumably, most thieves who steal securities do so with the intent to 
sell them quickly before the theft is discovered. With a conventional 
certificated security, this might take several days so that the registered 
owner might have the practical ability to give an effective stop transfer 
order. However, one of the greatest advantages—and in this case the 
disadvantage—of a blockchain is its speed. By the time the registered 
owner discovered that a cryptosecurity was missing, the thief’s sale 
would probably already have been settled so that it would be too late to 
give notice. 
F. Negotiability. 
One disadvantage of owning cryptosecurities directly, rather than 
indirectly through a securities intermediary, is that transferees will not be 
entitled to the protections of the super-negotiation rule discussed above, 
but only a traditional negotiation one. That is, Article 8 establishes a 
derivation rule as the default rule—a transferee takes subject to first-in-
time claims unless it can show that it qualifies for an exception. Only 
time will tell whether this distinction will be largely formal or whether it 
will have an empirical effect on the marketability of cryptosecurities. 
Specifically, Sec. 3-302 sets forth the default derivation rule that 
(with two exceptions that are beyond the scope of this Article) “a 
purchaser of a[n] . . . uncertificated security acquires all rights in the 
security that the transferor had or had power to transfer.” That is, if the 
security owned by the transferor were subject to an adverse claim, such 
as a security interest, then the transferee would take it subject to the 
security interest. This is mitigated, however, by Sec. 8-303(b), which sets 
forth the traditional negotiation exception that “[i]n addition to acquiring 
the rights of a purchaser, a protected purchaser also acquires its interests 
in the security free of any adverse claim.” 
A “protected purchaser”—a term added in the 1994 Amendments to 
replace the traditional term, “bonafide purchaser for value”—is a 
purchaser who: 
(1) gives value; 
(2) does not have notice of any adverse claim to the 
security; and 
(3) obtains control of the . . . certificated security. 
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Once again, in the U.C.C., the term purchaser is not limited to a 
buyer, but includes anyone who takes in a voluntary transaction 1843—i.e. 
almost anyone other than a thief of a lien creditor. 
“Value” is defined under Sec 1-204 as “any consideration sufficient 
to support a simple contract.” Consequently, donees, in addition to 
thieves and lien creditors, could not become protected purchasers, 
because traditional negotiation rules are designed to protect favored 
market transactions.1854 
What is or is not notice of an adverse claim is not governed by the 
usual rule of Article 1, but by Sec. 8-105. Although Sec. 8-105(a) does 
provide that willful blindness can constitute notice, this is somewhat 
mitigated by the definition of “adverse claim” in Sec. 8-102(a)(1), that 
encompasses not merely a “property interest in a financial asset” but a 
claim “that it is a violation of the rights of the claimant for another 
person to hold, transfer, or deal with the financial asset.” Moreover, Sec. 
8-105(e) clarifies that a filed “financing statement under Article 9 is not 
notice of an adverse claim to a financial asset.” Connecting the dots, it 
would seem unlikely that there would be many circumstances in which 
8-105 would apply unless the purchases was acting in affirmatively bad 
faith. Consequently, this may not, in practice, be that different from the 
“collusion” standard under super-negotiation rules in which case the vast 
majority of buyers of cryptosecurities will, as an empirical matter, take 
free and clear of security interests and other adverse claims. 
This does not mean that cryptosecurities can never be the subject of 
Article 8’s super-negotiation regime. An investor can choose to hold its 
cryptosecurities, as an uncertificated security, indirectly through a 
financial intermediary. 
One might object that to do so would destroy one of the advantages 
of issuing securities in bitcoin form—namely the ability to trade directly 
without the use of intermediaries. That is true. This means that some 
classes of investors, including large institutional investors and active day 
traders, will not choose to do so. 
However, holding cryptosecurities through intermediaries retains the 
advantage of faster, and perhaps more secure, settlement of trades than 
through the DTCC system. Consequently, if bitcoin stock trading were to 
become more common so that publicly traded companies issued their 
common stock in this form, many individual investors who use 
                                                                                                             
184  U.C.C. §§ 1-201(a)(29), (30) (2001). 
185  This does mean that donees never take free from adverse claims. The basic 
derivation principle of Sec. 8-302 is also a shelter rule. A donee who receives a gift from 
a donor, who is himself a protected purchaser, is not a protected purchaser, but she 
nevertheless inherits all the donor’s rights as such. U.C.C. § 8-302 (1994). 
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investment advisors may prefer the convenience of continuing to hold 
securities indirectly. 
CONCLUSION. 
Unless it is amended, the U.C.C. may keep bitcoin as a 
cryptocurrency or payment system from reaching its full potential. 
Cryptocurrency do not, nor can they be made to, fit within Article 9’s 
definition of “money.” Consequently, it falls within the catch-all 
category of “general intangible,” which is Article 9’s term for any form 
of personal property that does not fit into another defined category. The 
problem is that there is no negotiation, let alone super-negotiation, rule 
applicable to general intangibles. This means that once a security interest 
attaches to bitcoin, it will continue to be encumbered despite transfer. 
This is in sharp contrast to the “money,” which can, in most 
circumstances, be transferred free and clear of adverse claims including 
security interests. 
For example, if a debtor accepts bitcoin as payment upon the sale of 
inventory subject to a perfected security interest, the secured party will 
have a perfected security interest in the bitcoin as proceeds regardless of 
how many times it subsequently changes hands. Because any individual 
bitcoin can be traced on the blockchain, this could substantially decrease 
the utility of bitcoin as a currency and payment system. 
If, however, an owner of bitcoin were willing to hold it indirectly in 
a securities account maintained by a broker, bank or other party who 
qualifies as a “securities intermediary,” then the parties could elect to 
have bitcoin treated as a “financial asset” in which case super-
negotiation” rules of Article 8 apply. Consequently, any subsequent 
transferee of the bitcoin out of the account would take free of all adverse 
claims, unless he colluded with the original owner in violating the rights 
of another party. Unfortunately, to do so would defeat one of the greatest 
attractions of bitcoin—the ability to transfer value directly between 
parties without the use, and expense, of third-party intermediaries. 
Nevertheless, Article 8’s indirect ownership regime might have 
utility for used of the blockchain beyond cryptocurrencies. As the 
blockchain is a transfer ledger there is no reason why it couldn’t be used 
as a transfer protocol for any form of property. Once title to property was 
recorded on a blockchain, it could be transferred into an account 
maintained by a financial intermediary in which case it would be entitled 
to treatment as a financial asset. Moreover, there is no reason why, under 
current Article 9, the states couldn’t use a blockchain to establish a 
single, national, searchable, filing system for all debtors that could 
replace our current cumbersome state-by-state system. 
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For bitcoin to act more like a true currency, however, Article 9 
would need to be amended to add a new definition of cryptocurrency, to 
add a super-negotiation rule analogous to those that currently apply to 
money and deposit accounts under Sec. 9-332, and to add a provision 
whereby a secured party could perfect its security interest by taking 
“control” of bitcoin, understood in terms of the practical ability of a 
secured party to prevent the debtor from transferring the collateral. 
In contrast, surprisingly, the U.C.C. as currently drafted can easily 
accommodate the development of cryptosecurities that would be issued 
and traded on a blockchain. This is because cryptosecurities would fall 
within Article 8’s definition of “uncertificated securities.” Ironically, 
therefore, cryptosecurities could invigorate a rarely used statutory 
schema that was created to solve a completely different problem. 
